Secure and Privacy-Preserving Vehicular Communications by Lin, Xiaodong





presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2008
c©Xiaodong Lin, 2008
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the
thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
ii
Abstract
Road safety has been drawing increasing attention in the public, and has been subject
to extensive efforts from both industry and academia in mitigating the impact of traffic
accidents. Recent advances in wireless technology promise new approaches to facilitating
road safety and traffic management, where each vehicle (or referred to as On-board unit
(OBU)) is allowed to communicate with each other as well as with Roadside units (RSUs),
which are located in some critical sections of the road, such as a traffic light, an intersection,
and a stop sign. With the OBUs and RSUs, a self-organized network, called Vehicular Ad Hoc
Network (VANET), can thus be formed. Unfortunately, VANETs have faced various security
threats and privacy concerns, which would jeopardize the public safety and become the main
barrier to the acceptance of such a new technology. Hence, addressing security and privacy
issues is a prerequisite for a market-ready VANET. Although many studies have recently
addressed a significant amount of efforts in solving the related problems, few of the studies
has taken the scalability issues into consideration. When the traffic density is getting large,
a vehicle may become unable to verify the authenticity of the messages sent by its neighbors
in a timely manner, which may result in message loss so that public safety may be at risk.
Communication overhead is another issue that has not been well addressed in previously
reported studies. Many efforts have been made in recent years in achieving efficient broadcast
source authentication and data integrity by using fast symmetric cryptography. However, the
dynamic nature of VANETs makes it very challenging in the applicability of these symmetric
cryptography-based protocols.
In this research, we propose a novel Secure and Efficient RSU-aided Privacy Preservation
Protocol, called SERP 3, in order to achieve efficient secure and privacy-preserving Inter-
Vehicle Communications (IVCs). With the commitments of one-way key chains distributed
to vehicles by RSUs, a vehicle can effectively authenticate any received message from vehicles
nearby even in the presence of frequent change of its neighborship. Compared with previously
reported public key infrastructure (PKI)-based packet authentication protocols for security
iii
and privacy, the proposed protocol not only retains the security and privacy preservation
properties, but also has less packet loss ratio and lower communication overhead, especially
when the road traffic is heavy. Therefore, the protocol solves the scalability and commu-
nication overhead issues, while maintaining acceptable packet latency. However, RSU may
not exist in some situations, for example, in the early stage deployment phase of VANET,
where unfortunately, SERP 3 is not suitable. Thus, we propose a complementary Efficient and
Cooperative Message Validation Protocol, called ECMVP, where each vehicle probabilistically
validates a certain percentage of its received messages based on its own computing capacity
and then reports any invalid messages detected by it.
Since the ultimate goal of designing VANET is to develop vehicle safety/non-safety related
applications to improve road safety and facilitate traffic management, two vehicle applications
are further proposed in the research to exploit the advantages of vehicular communications.
First, a novel vehicle safety application for achieving a secure road traffic control system
in VANETs is developed. The proposed application helps circumvent vehicles safely and
securely through the areas in any abnormal situation, such as a car crash scene, while ensuring
the security and privacy of the drivers from various threats. It not only enhances traveler
safety but also minimizes capacity restrictions due to any unusual situation. Second, the
dissertation investigates a novel mobile payment system for highway toll collection by way
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Impaired driving, traffic congestion, and treacherous driving conditions have caused
numerous accidents every year all over the world, leading to great suffering to people
in different ways such as great anguish, fatal injuries and horrendous losses of human
lives. There were nearly 6,420,000 auto accidents in the United States in 2005 where 2.9
million people were injured and 42,636 people killed, which cause a financial loss of more
than 230 billion dollars. By statistics, about five people die every hour in vehicle crashes
in the United States, that is one death every 12 minutes [1]. Under such a circumstance,
how to improve driving safety has been drawing increasing attention in the public and
has been subject to extensive efforts from both industry and academia in mitigating
the impact of traffic accidents and injuries. For example, car manufacturers have made
great efforts to improve the safety of their vehicles by developing “passive” vehicle safety
systems, such as seat belts, air bag systems and crumple zones, which look to minimize
post-crash driver and passenger injury, as well as by accommodating “active” vehicle
safety systems that explore pre-collision accident avoidance, such as Anti-lock Braking
System (ABS) brakes, blind-spot safety, roll stability control, active steering systems,
1
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collision warning with brake support (CWBS), Lane Departure Warning System and
Mazda Pre-crash Safety System [2]. Although the aforementioned safety technologies
have led to enormous improvements on driving safety over the last few decades, we still
witness tremendous loss on the roads. Hence, it is crucial to explore the new techniques
to improve road safety.
Over the last twenty years, the miraculous evolution of wireless technology has
imposed a major impact on the revolution of human’s lifestyle by providing the best
ever convenience and flexibility in accessing the Internet services and various types
of personal communication applications. Recently, technologies built on 802.11p and
IEEE 1609 standards, 5.9 GHz Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) proto-
cols [3], are proposed to support advanced vehicle safety applications through effective,
reliable, and secure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) (also known as Inter-Vehicle Communica-
tion (IVC)) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications, which are also known
as Vehicle Safety Communications (VSC) technologies. U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion (USDOT) works with seven automotive manufacturers - BMW, DaimlerChrysler,
Ford, GM, Nissan, Toyota, and VW - to form the Vehicle Safety Communications
(VSC) Consortium (VSCC) to establish the VSC project to evaluate vehicle safety ap-
plications enabled or enhanced by external vehicle communications [4]. For example,
if a possible red light violation is detected at an intersection, the potential violator
will receive a warning to slow down to avoid unintentional red light violations. Mean-
while, a warning on the running red light event will be given to the other drivers at the
intersection thereby minimizing the possibility of collision.
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1.2 DSRC and VANET
1.2.1 DSRC
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) is one of short-range wireless proto-
cols, which is specifically designed for V2V and V2I communications to enhance the
safety and the productivity of the transportation system, which is also referred to In-
telligent Transportation System (ITS). Originally, DSRC is proposed to work in the
915 MHz band, and US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) later allocated
75 MHZ of spectrum at 5.9 GHz for DSRC in 1999. Similar activities also undergo in
Japan and Europe, where 5.8 GHz band is used for DSRC instead. The DSRC radio
technology is a variant of the IEEE 802.11a technology [5], which provides high data
transfer rates of up to 27 Mb/s over a range of 1km while maintaining low overhead
in the DSRC spectrum. Recently, both industry and academia have been extensively
working on standardization of DSRC. One of the activities is done by the IEEE P1609
Working Group, which is currently working on the IEEE 802.11p standard for both
PHY and MAC layer of DSRC, as well as applications and management services over
DSRC, which are also known as Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE).
Furthermore, VSC adopts IEEE 1609 standards to develop many DSRC/WAVE appli-
cations, which can be categorized into the following two classes according to different
aspects of their design premises and abilities.
• Vehicle safety-related applications: which are used to improve road safety. For
example, currently, drivers can only see the brake light of vehicles ahead of them;
and the brake light system can only demonstrate whether the vehicle is braking,
but cannot indicate the level of deceleration. When there is an emergency braking,
drivers may not see the break lights of any other vehicles but the one in front
of them, especially, when visibility is poor beyond the car in front of them (in
fog), or in heavy traffic when everyone is so close or behind bigger vehicles like
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minivans, trucks, and Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs). Under such a circumstance,
rear-end collisions could happen with a much larger chance. To countermeasure
the situation, V2V communication can serve to extend the range of brake light
signals for the drivers and as well indicate the level of deceleration (or referred
to as Extended Brake lights (EBL)) [4]. Through the V2V communication, the
hard braking information of a vehicle is disseminated in a timely fashion so that
the other vehicles can be alerted.
• Vehicle non-safety-related applications: which are used to facilitate traffic man-
agement and infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers. For example,
in the modern transportation systems, traffic lights take an important role in au-
tomatically performing traffic control and management in urban areas, which not
only enhance the driver safety but also facilitate smooth multiplexing at the in-
tersections. Hence, much attention has been put to make traffic light controllers
more intelligent, where collecting traffic related information plays an important
role in traffic flow control. Currently, this has been done by equipping the traf-
fic lights with sensing devices such as electromagnetic wires (loops), which are
embedded in street pavement. However, deploying sensors in pavement at an
intersection could be very expensive and difficult to maintain. In addition, the
sensors can become inaccurate and fail to regularly function as time goes by.
However, V2I communication can be used to effectively collect traffic informa-
tion. Through V2I communication, an RSU at an intersection can probe the
traffic load in all directions of the intersection, and then intelligently control the
corresponding traffic light according to the dynamic traffic load.
1.2.2 VANET
Nowadays, car manufactories and telecommunication industries have been gearing up to
equip each car with the technology that allows drivers and passengers to communicate
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with each other as well as with a roadside infrastructure that may be located in some
critical sections of the road, such as at every traffic light or any intersection or stop
sign, in order to improve the driving experience and make driving safer. For example,
Microsoft Corp.’s MSN TV and KVH Industries, Inc. have introduced an automotive
vehicle Internet access system called TracNet, which can bring the Internet service to
any in-car video screens. It also turns the entire vehicle into an IEEE 802.11-based
Wi-Fi hotspot, so passengers can use their wireless-enabled laptops to go online like
they are home or in the office. Furthermore, by using those equipped communication
devices, also known as On-Board Units (OBUs), vehicles can communicate with each
other as well as with the Roadside units (RSUs) located in the critical points of the
road. As shown in Fig. 1.1, a self-organized network can be formed by connecting the
vehicles and RSUs, which is called Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET), and the RSUs
are further connected to the backbone network via the high speed network connections.
An increasing interest has been raised recently on the applications through V2V and
V2I communications, aiming to improve driving safety and traffic management while
providing drivers and passengers with Internet access. It is estimated that the market
for vehicular communications will reach to multi-billions dollars by 2012.
In VANETs, RSUs can provide assistance in finding the facilities such as restau-
rants and gas stations, and broadcast traffic-related messages such as “maximum curve
turning speed” notifications to give drivers a heads up. For example, a vehicle can com-
municate to a traffic light through V2I communications, and traffic light can indicate
to the vehicle when turning to yellow or red. This can be served as an advance-warning
sign to the drivers, and will be very helpful to the drivers when they are driving during
winter weather conditions or in an unfamiliar area, especially when facing a wide angle
of road curve ahead of a traffic light. This could reduce the occurrence of red light run-
ning with a disaster circumstance. Through V2V communications, on the other hand,
the drivers can get a better awareness of what’s going on in their driving environment

























Figure 1.1: Vehicular ad hoc network
and take early actions to respond to an abnormal situation. For achieving this, an
OBU regularly broadcasts routine traffic-related messages with the information of po-
sition, current time, driving direction, speed, brake status, steering angle, turn signal,
acceleration/deceleration, traffic conditions, and traffic events. In addition, emergency
messages can be generated and sent by OBUs in case of emergent braking, traffic jam,
or any accident, etc. For example, as shown in Fig. 1.2, whenever there is an accident
on a highway, several lanes can be blocked. Drivers can experience a long delay. How-
ever, the delay can be mitigated if drivers are informed in advance so that they can
follow detour route or change lane to avoid a traffic jam.
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Left lane closed ahead due to accident. 
Please prepare to change into the right 
lane.
There is an accidentin m y
area,w hich blocks the left
lane.
Left lane closed ahead due to accident. 





















Figure 1.2: An example of road emergency response operation under VANET
1.3 Research Motivations and Objectives
1.3.1 Motivations
The creation of VANETs is obviously a great plus to the road driving safety and traffic
management. However, the design of VANETs comes with a set of newly emerged
challenges, especially in the aspects of security and privacy. As a special implementation
of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), VANETs inherit all the known and unknown
security weaknesses. Any malicious behavior of users, such as a modification and
replay on the disseminated messages, could be fatal to other users. In addition, the
issues on VANET security become more challenging due to the unique features of the
networks, such as high mobility and an extremely large amount of network entities
(i.e., the vehicles). Furthermore, conditional privacy preservation must be achieved
in the sense that the user-related privacy information, including the driver’s name,
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the license plate, speed, position, and traveling routes along with their relationship,
has to be protected; while the authorities should be able to reveal the identities of
message senders in the event of traffic disputes, such as a crime/car accident scene
investigation. Hence, addressing security and privacy issues is a prerequisite for any
vehicle applications based on VANETs. To sum up the above, it is obviously a critical
task to develop a suite of carefully designed security mechanisms for achieving security
and conditional privacy preservation in a VANET. Until recently, however, security and
privacy issues of VANETs have been subject to little attention, which has formed a
major barrier that prevents many car manufacturers from employing the state-of-the-
art wireless communication devices.
Security Threats
There are several possible security attacks in VANETs, which are listed as follows:
• Bogus information attack: The adversary may send fake messages to meet a spe-
cific purpose. For example, one may send a fake approaching emergency vehicle
warning in order to push over the others such that it can manipulate to get a
better traffic condition.
• Unauthorized preemption attack: An RSU could be used to control a traffic light
when any emergent situation occurs. Similar to the bogus information attack,
the adversary may illegally interrupt a traffic light through the RSU in order to
meet some specific purposes [6].
• Message replay attack: The adversary replays the valid messages sent by a legit-
imate user some time before in order to disturb the traffic.
• Message modification attack: A message is altered during or after transmission.
The adversary may wish to change the source or content of the message in terms
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of the position and/or time information that had been sent and saved in its device
to escape from the consequence of a criminal/car accident event.
• Impersonation attack: The adversary may pretend to be another vehicle or even
an RSU to fool the others.
• RSU replication attack: An RSU may be compromised such that the adversary
can relocate the compromised RSU to launch any malicious attack, such as broad-
casting fake traffic information.
• Denial of service (DoS) attack: The adversary sends irrelevant bulk messages
to take up the channels and consume the computational resources of the other
nodes, such as RF interference or jamming or layer 2 packet flooding [7].
Privacy Threats
Since a VANET is on an open shared medium, which allows illegal collection and pro-
cessing of information easy to happen. After the adversary intercepts a significant
amount of messages in a certain region, the adversary may trace a vehicle in terms of
its physical position and moving patterns simply through information analysis. Since
drivers concern the leakage of the aforementioned sensitive information to the pub-
lic, resolving the concern becomes one of the major issues in the design of a modern
VANET.
• Personal information leakage: If information transmitted over a VANET is not
protected, an adversary can easily collect the information by sniffing the network
and discover some user-related sensitive information, such as a driver’s name,
address, license. The personal identification information leakage could result in
identity theft, which may disrupt a person’s life.
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• Location privacy: After an adversary intercepts a significant amount of messages
in a certain region, the adversary may be able to trace a vehicle in terms of its
physical position and moving patterns simply through information analysis.
Since the topic on DoS attacks in wireless communication networks has been exten-
sively investigated [8–11], in this study, we will focus on the security and privacy issues
which are not related to the DoS attack.
Traceability
Traceability is another very crucial issue in VANETs. It is very common to have an
emergency or a dispute on our roads, and it is always the road authority’s desire and
enthusiasm to find someone who may be able to provide valuable information about
the incident. Hence, the authority should be able to reveal the real identities of the
message senders when needed1.
1.3.2 Objectives
The objective of this research is to develop a set of efficient secure and privacy-
preserving protocols to countermeasure and mitigate the aforementioned security and
privacy threats. Further, the protocols should ensure that road authorities can reveal
the real identities of the message senders in order to guard the truth when there is any
dispute or need to track down the drivers.
The study also develops two vehicle applications, which are as follows:
• Develop a novel vehicle safety application, secure VANET-based road traffic con-
trol system, to help to circumvent vehicles safely and securely through an area of
an abnormal situation.
1In this thesis, we term the co-existed privacy and identity traceability as conditional privacy.
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• Develop a novel mobile payment system for highway toll collection through ve-
hicular communications, which addresses all the issues in the currently existing
toll collection technologies.
1.4 Research Contributions
This research focuses on developing a suite of interoperable approaches to tackle the
most critical problems in the efforts of achieving security guarantee and privacy preser-
vation for VANETs. In addition, this study also aims at developing value-added services
in VANETs, vehicle applications. Specifically, the main contributions of this research
lie in:
• A security infrastructure for VANETs is introduced, where the concept of ePer-
mit is defined which serves as a proof of an authorized driver to drive the vehicle
and to activate the security system based on proxy signature;
• An efficient approach in distributing the commitments of one-way key chains to
vehicles by RSUs is proposed for achieving efficient V2V communications and en-
suring effective message authentication. It solves the main barrier to the applica-
bility of symmetric cryptography-based protocols in vehicular networks. Further,
a complementary cooperative message validation protocol is introduced to deal
with the situations where RSUs may not exist in VANETs.
• Two vehicle applications are developed to explore the advantages of vehicular
communications. First, a secure VANET-based road traffic control system is
proposed to help to circumvent vehicles safely and securely through an area of
an abnormal situation, while ensuring the security and privacy of the users from
various threats. It not only enhances traveler safety but also minimizes capacity
restrictions due to any abnormal situation. Second, a novel mobile payment
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system for highway toll collection through vehicular communication is proposed to
address all the issues existed in the current traditional toll collection technologies.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
The organization of the remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides a survey
on state-of-the-art research on security and privacy preservation in VANETs. Chapter 3
presents a Secure and Efficient RSU-aided Privacy-Preserving Protocol (SERP 3). Chap-
ter 4 presents a complementary Efficient and Cooperative Message Validation Protocol
(ECMVP) for some situations where RSUs may not exist in VANETs. Chapter 5
presents a novel vehicle safety application, secure VANET-based road traffic control
system. In Chapter 6, a novel mobile payment system for highway toll collection is
presented. Finally, conclusions and future research work are described in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Related Work
Securing V2V and V2I communications is mandatory in VANETs, and has drawn
tremendous attention from both industry and academia. Over the past a few years, a
number of initiatives have been launched. The Vehicle Safety Communications (VSC)
project [4], which was initiated by US DOT in 2002, aims to evaluate the feasibility of
supporting vehicle safety/non-safety-related applications through telecommunication
technologies, such as the DSRC standard [3]. The VSC project investigates the se-
curity issues associated with VSC and identifies four major security goals for a VSC
system: message integrity/origin authentication, correctness, privacy, and robustness
under attack. In addition, the project discusses possible solutions for the aforemen-
tioned security goals. The VSC project proposes a dual authentication structure in
which a list of short-lived anonymous certificates is taken to guarantee the privacy of
OBUs and ensure the security, where the short-lived certificates are discarded once after
being used. It is worth noting that a pseudonym is used in any anonymous certificate
instead of the real identity of the vehicle, which protect the privacy of the vehicle. In
addition, the classic hierarchical public key infrastructure (PKI) is presented for the
purpose of ensuring the security of RSUs and public safety OBUs since RSUs and public
safety OBUs do not have any issue of privacy. The scheme can provide a higher level of
13
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privacy preservation and security assurance because the certificates are blindly signed
by the Certificate Authority (CA) in order to deal with any possible insider attack.
An insider attack could be simply launched by the CA which abuses its authority by
mishandling the driver information. In order to achieve traceability, a linkage is devised
for the escrow authorities to associate each blindly signed anonymous certificate with a
single vehicle. All the compromised and expired vehicles have to be revoked by putting
anonymous certificates belonging to those vehicles into the certificate revocation list
(CRL). The disadvantage of this scheme is that the CRL may grow quickly such that
it takes a long time to check through the whole CRL to see if a given certificate is
valid or not. Another disadvantage lies in the fact that for achieving traceability, a
unique electronic identity is assigned to each vehicle by which the identity of the ve-
hicle owner can be inspected by the polices and authorities in case of any disputes.
Although this scheme can effectively meet the conditional anonymity requirement, it
is far from efficient and can hardly become a scalable and reliable approach because
the ID management authority has to keep all the anonymous certificates for the vehi-
cles in the administrative region. Once a malicious message is identified, the authority
has to exhaustedly search in a very large database to find the identity related to the
compromised anonymous certificate.
Similar activities are underway in Europe. The European Car-2-Car communication
consortium [12], which is backed by General Motors, Audi, BMW, Fiat, Honda, Re-
nault, etc, has been formed to work on V2V technologies to help to make driving safer
and improve driving experience. A prerequisite for the successful deployment of vehic-
ular communications is to ensure that the vehicular communication is secure and the
driver privacy is protected. Secure Vehicular Communication (SeVeCom) project [13],
which is part of the eSafety initiative [14], the Information Society and Media initia-
tive [15], and the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission [16], is
then funded in Europe to identify the variety of security and privacy threats facing
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vehicular communications, define security requirements for vehicular communications,











































* Assume that Alice is the sender and Bob is the  receiver.
Figure 2.1: IEEE Std 1609.2 security services framework for creating and exchanging
WAVE message between WAVE devices
Meanwhile, international standardizing bodies have addressed a lot of efforts in
standardizing V2V communication technologies. The IEEE 1609 WAVE communi-
cation standards, which are also known as Dedicated Short Range Communications
(DSRC) protocols, have emerged recently to enhance the 802.11 to support wireless
communications among vehicles for the roadside infrastructure [5]. The IEEE 1609.2
standard addresses the issues of securing WAVE messages against eavesdropping, spoof-
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ing, and other attacks. The components of the IEEE Std 1609.2 security infrastructure
are shown in Fig. 2.1, and are based on industry standards for PKI, including the sup-
port for Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [17], WAVE certificate formats, and hybrid
encryption methods, in order to provide secure services for WAVE communications.
The security infrastructure is also responsible for the administrative functions, which
are necessary to support the core security functions, such as certificate revocation. Note
that due to some unexpected reasons, for example, a private key corresponding to a
public key specified in the certificate is identified as compromised, certificate revoca-
tion is essential to any security system based on PKI, which has not been addressed in
the current IEEE Std 1609.2 by considering the unique features of vehicular networks.
In addition, IEEE 1609.2 standard does not define driver identification and privacy
protection, and has left a lot of open issues.
In traditional PKI architecture, the most commonly adopted certificate revocation
scheme is through CRL, which is a list of revoked certificates stored in central reposi-
tories prepared in CAs. Based on such centralized architecture, alternative solutions to
CRL could be by way of a Certificate Revocation System (CRS), Certificate Revocation
Tree (CRT), and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [18], etc. The common
requirement for these schemes is the high availability of the centralized CAs, where
frequent data transmission with the OBUs for obtaining timely revocation information
may cause significant overhead. Thus, with the high-speed mobility and extremely large
amount of network entities in VANETs, the centralized CRL architecture may cause
scalability problems. To tackle the problem, Raya et al. [19] proposed three certificate
revocation protocols for VANETs, namely Revocation using Compressed Certificate
Revocation Lists (RC2RL), Revocation of the Tamper-Proof Device (RTPD), and Dis-
tributed Revocation Protocol (DRP). RC2RL uses a compression technique to reduce
the overhead of the distribution of the CRL. Instead of checking the status of a certifi-
cate, RTPD removes revoked certificates from their corresponding vehicles’ certificate
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stores by introducing a tamper-proof device as a vehicle key and certificate manage-
ment tool. In this case, the vehicle possessing the revoked certificates is informed of
the certification revocation incident, by which the tamper-proof device automatically
removes those revoked certificates. Different from RC2RL and RTPD, a distributed
certificate revocation mechanism is implemented in DRP to determine the status of a
certificate. In DRP, each vehicle is equipped with an attacker detection system, which
enables a vehicle to identify any compromised peer. When a compromised or malicious
vehicle is detected and located, its neighbors can work together to temporally revoke
the compromised one.
Securing VANETs has been subject to extensive research efforts in recent years,
and has been well recognized as a prerequisite for the emerging applications such as
vehicle safety-related services, and vehicle non-safety-related services [4]. To address
the issues of security and conditional privacy in VANETs, three categories of solutions
have been introduced. In the first category, each vehicle is securely equipped with
a large number of short-life anonymous key pairs (probably 43,800 pairs), hereafter
anonymous credentials [20]. Then, each vehicle randomly selects one of its anonymous
credentials and uses the corresponding private key to sign the launched messages. The
other vehicles authenticate the sender of the messages by using the public key of the
sender. In addition, instead of taking any real identity information of the vehicles, these
anonymous credentials are generated by taking the pseudo IDs of the vehicles in order to
achieve privacy. Finally, the whole list of anonymous credentials correspond to a unique
real identity, which should be kept by the authorities in order for the police to verify
the real-world identities of the vehicles. In the second category, group signature and
Identity-based signature techniques are adopted not only to guarantee the requirements
of security and privacy, but also to provide desired traceability of each vehicle [21].
Finally, an efficient conditional privacy preservation (ECPP) protocol is introduced by
the way of generating on-the-fly short-time anonymous key pairs between vehicles and
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RSUs, which can provide fast anonymous authentication and privacy tracking while
minimizing the required storage for short-time anonymous key pairs [22].
Unfortunately, the aforementioned solutions of updating pseudonyms are ineffective
to protect location privacy and prevent tracking in VANETs. In other words, unlinka-
bility cannot be guaranteed due to the fact that it is trivial to link an old pseudonym
with a new pseudonym when vehicles constantly broadcast routine traffic information
include their location and speed and driving directions, but without any type of mix.
Even worse, if the adversary could link someone to the OBU’s destinations, e.g., an of-
fice and a home, user anonymity cannot be achieved as well. To cope with this location
privacy issue, Sampigethaya et al. proposed a location privacy scheme for VANETs
called CARAVAN in which a vehicle remains silent for a randomly chosen short period
of time after it enters a certain area of the network [23]. Freudiger et al. [24] introduced
a solution by creating cryptographic mix-zones at some critical points on the roads, in
which all traffic-related messages broadcast by the vehicles are encrypted and protected,
and the vehicles also change their pseudonyms. Therefore, the sensitive information
such as vehicle position information, which could lead to the violation of location pri-
vacy, is no longer visible to external attackers. Furthermore, a vehicular mix-network
is built by combining all mix-zones to enhance location privacy in VANETs. Hence,
the location privacy can be achieved.
The ultimate goal of building vehicular communication network is to develop various
vehicle applications which could improve road safety and driving experience via vehic-
ular communication. As applications built on VANETs, vehicle applications inherit
all the known and unknown security weaknesses that are associated with VANETs,
and could further be subject to many application-specific security and privacy threats.
However, only few attention has been paid to security in vehicle applications. In [25],
Rahman et al. proposed a secure architecture for VANET-based automated crash
reporting application called Autocore after identifying several application-specific se-
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curity and privacy threats. By introducing a concept of Road-worthiness certificate, a
vehicle can be effectively authenticated and then obtain a list of anonymous credentials
from regional authorities via RSUs. Afterwards, those anonymous credentials can be
used to protect the broadcast messages and as well ensure the privacy of the OBUs
since those anonymous credentials are blindly signed by the authorities. Furthermore,
different from any previously reported studies, a decentralized architecture has been
introduced to achieve the conditional privacy of the OBUs, which prevents a single
point of failure.
Chapter 3
Secure and Efficient RSU-aided
Privacy-Preserving Protocol
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, protocols have been developed to ensure secure and privacy-preserving
communications over the vehicular communications network. In any of the previously
reported protocols, a vehicle sender signs each message and broadcasts it, while each
receiver verifies the received message using the corresponding public key. With asym-
metric algorithms, the protocols will certainly induce heavy signature and authenti-
cation overhead, which make them not scalable when the traffic load is high, which,
unfortunately, could be the situation commonly seen in metropolitan-area transporta-
tion. According to DSRC [3], a vehicle sends each message with a time interval from
100ms to 300ms. In the case that 50 to 120 cars are within the communication range
of a vehicle, the vehicle needs to verify up to 1, 200 messages per second, which will
obviously lead to a high computation burden and communication overhead. As shown
in Table 3.1, none of traditional digital signature algorithms can achieve the desired
verification speed and communication overhead.
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Table 3.1: Verification speed and signature overhead of digital signature schemes
Digital signature scheme RSA (2048 bits) DSA (2048 bits) ECDSA (224 bits)
Verification speed (verifications/s) 1370 62 258
Signature (bits) 2048 4096 448
Public key certificate∗ (bytes) 125 125 125
† We evaluate the verification speed and signature overhead of digital signature schemes on
an Intel Pentium 4 3.0 GHz machine with 1GB RAM running Fedora Core 4 based on
cryptographic library MIRACL (http://www.shamus.ie/).
∗ The size of a signing certificate for an OBU is 125 bytes [5].
To avoid the heavy signature and authentication overhead caused by asymmetric
cryptography, significant efforts have been made in recent years in achieving efficient
broadcast source authentication and data integrity by using fast symmetric cryptogra-
phy [26–29], where TESLA [29] is among the most promising ones. However, due to the
dynamic nature of VANETs, the use of a symmetric cryptography-based scheme may
cause some other problems [5]. The main challenge lies in how to efficiently distribute
commitments of one-way key chains to a highly dynamic group in VANETs in order
for vehicles within the transmission range to freely authenticate each other. Motivated
by the possibly advantages in taking symmetric cryptography, this chapter introduces
a novel secure and efficient RSU-aided privacy-preserving protocol for VANETs. The
major contributions of the chapter lies in the following two aspects: 1) a security in-
frastructure for VANET is introduced, where the concept of ePermit is defined which
serves as a proof of an authorized driver to drive the vehicle and to activate the security
system based on proxy signature; and 2) an efficient approach in distributing commit-
ments of one-way key chains to vehicles by RSUs is proposed for achieving efficient
IVCs and ensuring effective message authentication.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, preliminaries
are presented. In Section 3.3, a secure and efficient RSU-aided privacy-preserving pro-
tocol is introduced. Section 3.4 discusses the security and performance of the proposed
protocol. Finally, we give the summary in Section 3.5.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 One-Way Key Chain
One-way hash chain was first proposed in [30] for secure password authentication, which
quickly became an important cryptographic primitive in many other applications, such
as micropayment systems [31], secure data forwarding in wireless ad hoc networks [32],
and stream data authentication [33]. A one-way hash chain is repeated applications
of a secure one-way hash function H(x) to a randomly selected seed S, which has the
following properties:
• H(x) can take a message of arbitrary-length input and produce a message digest
of a fixed-length output;
• Given x, it is easy to compute y = H(x). However, it is hard to compute
x = H−1(y) for a given y.
• Given x, it is computationally infeasible to find x′ 6= x such that H(x′) = H(x);




The application of the hash function on S for n− 1 times yields results denoted as
h1, h2, · · · , hn, respectively, where hi−1 = H(hi), hn = S, 1 < i ≤ n, and h1 is called
the commitment to the chain h1, h2, · · · , hn. Similarly, each chain element commits to
all the subsequent elements in the chain shown in Fig. 3.1. Then, the holder of the
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hash chain can release the chain elements one after another in an opposite order of that
the chain to be generated. In this way, any hash chain element can be kept unrevealed
before it is released, and upon receiving a chain element, its authenticity can be easily









hn The seed of the hash chain h1,…,hn.
HHHH
h1 The commitment to the hash chain h1,…,hn.
Figure 3.1: One-way hash chain
One-way hash chain can always be used to reduce the authentication load of a se-
ries of messages. For example, in TESLA, the chain elements are used as secret keys
to compute message authentication codes (MACs) of the messages. Further, time is
slotted and synchronized between senders and receivers, and each chain element cor-
responds to a specific time slot. By using the delayed secret key disclosure technique,
the authenticity of a message can be guaranteed by verifying the MAC after the au-
thenticity of the released key is checked against the relationship between it and any
previously received genuine chain elements since any previously received chain element
is a commitment to it. In this case, the chain is referred to as one-way key chain,
denoted as KC(n, h1, hn), where n is the length of the key chain, h1 is the commitment
to the chain, hn is the seed of the chain.
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3.2.2 Bilinear Pairing and ID-based Cryptography
Bilinear pairing can solve some previously well recognized unsolvable problems, such
as ID-based cryptography (IBC) [34]. IBC is a public-key cryptosystem where any
string can be used to derive a valid public key such as user names, email addresses, IP
addresses, host or node names. Compared with conventional public key cryptosystems,
IBC simplifies the certificate management since the public key of a user could be any
of its publicly known identity. Another advantage is that they can save communication
bandwidth compared with traditional schemes such as RSA [35] and ElGamal [36]
because pairing-based schemes feature a relatively small signature overhead due to the
usage of bilinear pairing in the design of signature schemes and/or security protocols.
As the preliminary of the proposed protocol, bilinear pairing is briefly reviewed as
follows.
let G1 be a cyclic additive group and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same
prime order q. We assume that the discrete logarithm problems in both G1 and G2 are
hard. A bilinear pairing is a map ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 which satisfies the following three
properties:
• Bilinear: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab, where P,Q ∈ G1, and a, b ∈ Z∗q.
• Non-degenerate: There exists P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G1 such that ê(P,Q) 6= 1G2 , where
1G2 is the identity element of G2.
• Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P,Q) for all
P,Q ∈ G1.
According to [34], the modified Weil or Tate pairing associated to supersingular
elliptic curves can create such bilinear pairings.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Parameter Generator) A bilinear parameter generator Gen
is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input and outputs a
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5-tuple (q,G1,G2, ê, P ) as the bilinear parameters, including a prime number q with
|q| = k, two cyclic groups G1, G2 of the same order q, an admissible bilinear map
ê : G1 ×G1 → G2 and a generator P of G1.
3.2.3 Proxy Signature
The concept of proxy signature was first introduced in [37, 38]. As a variation of
the standard digital signature, a proxy signature is very useful when a user (called
original signer) tries to delegate her/his signing right to other user (called proxy signer).
Once such a delegation is performed, the proxy signer can then sign on behalf of
the original signer. Upon receiving a proxy signature, anyone can check its validity
and will be convinced by the original signer’s agreement on the signed message if
the validation is positive. Recently, proxy signature schemes have been adopted in a
number of applications, including electronic commerce and distributed shared objected
systems [39, 40].
Based on the delegation type in different applications, they can be classified as full
delegation, partial delegation and delegation by warrant. With a full delegation scheme,
the original signer’s private key is directly given to the proxy signer so that the proxy
signer can have the same signing capability as the original signer, and the signatures
generated by the original or the proxy signers are undistinguishable. Therefore, full del-
egation scheme is impractical and insecure in practice. In a partial delegation scheme,
the original signer distributes a proxy secret key (different from the original signer’s
private key) to the proxy signer. Hence, the proxy signatures generated by the proxy
secret key are different from the original signer’s signatures. However, the messages
that a proxy signer could sign are not limited, which could result in the risk of abuse
of a delegated authority. With a delegation by warrant scheme, the weaknesses in the
previous two schemes are removed by a warrant that specifies what kind of message to
be delegated. The warrant is created by the original signer, which keeps the related
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delegation information including the identity of the original signer and proxy signer, as
well as the restrictions on the message that the proxy signer is allowed to sign [41–43].
3.3 Secure and Efficient RSU-aided Privacy-Preserving
Protocol
The proposed secure and efficient RSU-aided privacy-preserving protocol called SERP 3
consists of the following five phases: system initialization phase, pseudo identity and
private key generation phase, anonymous mutual authentication phase, one-way key
chain commitment distribution phase between OBUs and RSUs, the OBU safety mes-
sage signing and verification phase. For the sake of presentation, the notations in this
chapter are listed in Table 3.2.
3.3.1 Threat Model
By taking the advantage that RSUs are not subject to any privacy issue, an elaborated
solution based on ID-based signature was proposed to address the security issues existed
in RSUs [21]. In this chapter, we will focus on the security and privacy issues related
to each vehicle, which are described in Section 1.3.1.
3.3.2 System Model
Inspired by the fact that only the authorized drivers with all required documents, for
example, insurance policy, can drive a car, the proposed protocol is embedded with
eight entities in the system, including car manufacturer, car sellers, vehicle owners,
the Ministry of Transportation (MTO), MTO’s authorized safety inspection/emission
test stations, insurance companies, vehicle owners’ authorized drivers, and police road
safety enforcement authority, as shown in Fig. 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Notations
Notation Descriptions
PKMTO: The public key of the MTO
SKMTO: The private key of the MTO
PKowner: The public key of the owner
SKowner: The private key of the owner
Certowner: The certificate of the owner signed by the MTO
ridowner: The real identity of the vehicle owner
PKinsurance: The public key of the insurance company
SKinsurance: The private key of the insurance company
Certinsurance: The certificate of the insurance company signed by the MTO
PKsafety: The public key of the safety inspection station
SKsafety: The private key of the safety inspection station
PSKsafety: The proxy signing key of the safety inspection station athorized by the MTO
Certsafety: The certificate of the safety inspection station signed by the MTO
Warrantsafety: A proxy warrant containing delegation between the safety inspection station
and the MTO, type of information authorized to sign, and expiration date.
s: The private master key of the TA
Ppub: The public key of the TA
rid: The real identity of the vehicle
pid: The pseudo identity of the vehicle
Mi: A message sent by the vehicle Vi
h(.): A one-way hash function such that SHA-1
H0(.): A MapToPoint hash [58] function such as H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1
||: Message concatenation operation, which appends several messages together
in a special format
d e: The ceiling function
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Figure 3.2: Procedure for vehicle’s road readiness
First, all car manufacturers need to meet a series of different requirements set by
the government who governs a region, and let their cars overcome stringent regulatory
standards in order to sell the cars in that region. Afterwards, the public key and the
related information of Ministry of Transportation, which serves as the representative
of the government, will be preloaded to a tamper-proof device (TPD) of each vehicle
by the car manufacturers. Then, the vehicle will be delivered to a car dealer, and
be sold to a vehicle owner. To make the vehicles legitimate in the public usage, the
vehicles have to pass some tests before registered with the MTO, such as emission test
and safety inspection. Afterwards, the test station will issue a vehicle safety inspection
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and/or emission test pass certificate to the vehicle owner. However, depending on
regulations, those tests may be waived for brand new vehicles and vehicles with model
years less than certain years old, e.g., 3 years. Therefore, the car manufacturers are the
default authorized safety inspection and/or emission test station as well, and the brand
new cars will be equipped with a vehicle safety inspection and/or emission test pass
certificate. Here, an authorized safety inspection and/or emission test station serves as
a delegate to sign certificates by using proxy signature on behalf of MTO.
Second, the vehicle owner needs to register the purchased vehicle with MTO by
submitting all necessary information, such as Vehicle Identification Number (VIN),
vehicle safety inspection certificate, and emission test pass certificate. It is worth noting
that every vehicle has a unique VIN. MTO then loads the owner information into the
TPD of the vehicle including the real identity of the owner. Also, the vehicle owner
needs to apply for appropriate car insurance. For instance, if the owner wants to have
a secondary driver for her/his car, the owner needs to buy insurance for herself/himself
and as well the secondary driver. An evidence of insured is issued by the insurance
company to the owner. Finally, the owner can authorize any allowed person to drive
the car by issuing an ePermit to her/him, but the allowed driver should match the
insured person listed in the insurance policy.
Third, the vehicle owner and other authorized drivers if applicable can drive the car
on the road by using holding ePermit to authenticate with the TPD and activate it
if passed, which will be detailed later. An ePermit has the following structure shown
in Figure 3.3. Finally, the police can enforce the road readiness of vehicles by checking
whether a vehicle on the road broadcasts authentic routine traffic-related message.
The considered road system architecture is mainly composed of the immobile RSUs
at the roadside and the mobile OBUs equipped on the moving vehicles, as shown in
Fig. 3.4. The RSUs and OBUs are dynamically interconnected with each other to form
a VAENT, and those RSUs are further connected to the Internet backbone via some



















VIN Authorized driver ID rid ExpirationDatepermit
SignSKowner(VIN,Authorized driver ID rid,ExpirationDatepermit)
Certowner
Figure 3.3: The structure of ePermit
high-speed links. In this chapter, we assume that each road intersection is equipped
with one RSU so that the road system can be viewed as a network interconnected
by RSUs. In addition, an RSU is subject to no power constraint and there is no
energy limit for vehicles. The vehicle’s communication device is actively powered for
any computation and communication task. As shown in Fig. 3.5, the vehicles are
equipped with various sensors, e.g., reliable positioning system like GPS, and all the
vehicles are loosely synchronized, e.g., equipped with a highly accurate atomic clock or
through a central satellite. The output of those sensors become input for some vehicle
applications, e.g., rear end collision warning, which analyze these data and format
findings accordingly [44].
Furthermore, each vehicle is equipped with a tamper-proof device (TPD) to store
cryptographic key, data, and code, which is secure against any compromise attempt in
the way that an attacker cannot extract any data stored in the device. The TPD is
composed of four modules: an authentication module which enables user authentication
by way of the OBU, a pseudo identity generation module which generates random
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street
RSU
Figure 3.4: Road system architecture
pseudo identity, a private key generation module which calculates the corresponding
private key of a pseudo identity, and an event recorder which records any data launched
from and received by the vehicle as shown in Fig. 3.5. The four modules will be further
discussed in the next section.
The driver needs to authenticate his credentials, i.e., ePermit, with his TPD. The
TPD needs to validate the permit by checking through ownership proof, the evidence
of insured, safety inspection status, and legitimation of the driver. After successful
authentication, the TPD is enabled to periodically generate short-time anonymous
key pairs, which have two usages. Firstly, those anonymous key pairs can be used to
request a limited-time one-way key chain from an RSU, and the chain element is the
secret key to compute a MAC of data from various installed vehicle applications, which
is similar to TESLA [29]. Secondly, those short-time anonymous key pairs can also
be used to cryptographically process data directly when the vehicles are in rural and
suburban areas without RSUs. Afterwards, the result will be broadcast to the vehicle’s
neighboring vehicles.
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Module for Performing Cryptographic Processing
1 2
pseudo ID corresponding private key Wireless Transmission
Module
Anonymous Key Generation
Figure 3.5: OBU architecture
Furthermore, in order to ensure both security and privacy in vehicular communi-
cation networks, we need to consider various attacks that might be mounted. In this
study, we consider the highest security scenario where there exists a passive global
attacker who is able to eavesdrop on any message transmitted over the VANETs.
3.3.3 System Initialization Phase
Suppose that there exists an offline trust authority (TA) which is in charge of checking
the vehicle’s identity and pre-distributing the private master key of the TA. Prior to
the network deployment, the TA sets up the system parameters for each RSU and OBU
as follows.
• Given the security parameter k, a 5-tuple bilinear parameter (q,G1,G2, ê, P ) is
generated by running the bilinear parameter generator Gen(k).
• The TA randomly chooses two secure primes p0, q0 such that p0 ≡ q0 ≡ 3 mod 4
and s ∈ Z∗q as its master key, and computes n0 = p0 ·q0 and Ppub = sP ∈ G1 as the
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corresponding public keys. Let H0(.) be a MapToPoint hash [58] function such as
H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. Then, the public parameters are (q,G1,G2, ê, P, Ppub, H0, n0).
• The tamper-proof device of each vehicle and each RSU is preloaded with the
public parameters (q,G1,G2, ê, P, Ppub, H0, n0) and the master key (s, p0, q0) of
the TA. Each RSU has an ID idr, which may include the name of the RSU, the
authorized geographical region to operate, and the authorized message type. The
TA computes SRRSU = sH0(idr) as the RSU’s private key. Then this private key
of the RSU is stored in the RSU’s tamper-proof device as well.
• To activate the tamper-proof device, the driver has to present a valid ePermit.
Hence, an attacker cannot take advantages of the tamper-proof device even if the
vehicle is stolen.
Each vehicle maintains a key chain commitment table for facilitating the packet
source authentication, whose format of each entry is shown as follows.
Source Index c Lifetime
where the first field records a packet source’s pseudo ID; the second field records the
index of the time interval when the last key chain element is received successfully; the
third field records the last successfully received key chain element; and the last field
Lifetime serves as a timer controlling how long the entry is active. If the timer hits 0,
the entry is expired and removed from the vehicle’s cache table.
3.3.4 Pseudo Identity and Private Key Generation Phase
The driver first needs to use her/his possessing ePermit to activate the TPD, where
the authentication module of the TPD works as an access control mechanism. If the
ePermit successfully passes the verification of the authentication module, the driver’s
real ID rid is delivered to the pseudo identity generation module. Otherwise, the
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TPD denies providing services for the vehicle. Obviously, the authentication module
enhances the security of the TPD since a malicious attacker cannot take advantage of
it even though the TPD is physically held by the attacker if the attacker does not have
any valid authentication credential.
The pseudo identity generation module periodically generates random pseudo iden-
tities from the authenticated rid, which serves as public keys of the OBU, and as well
pass those keys to the private key generation module, which generates the corresponding
private key by using Identity-based cryptography [34], which is shown in Algorthm 1.
Finally, a vehicle can obtain a list of pseudo identities pidi along with the corre-
sponding private keys ski, where i = 1, 2, 3, .......
3.3.5 Anonymous Mutual Authentication Phase
In this phase, a vehicle authenticates itself to an RSU and the RSU authenticates itself
to the vehicle in such a way that both parties are assured of the others’ legitimacy but
the vehicle stays anonymous whenever the vehicle is within the transmission range of
the RSU. Then, the RSU distributes one or more one-way key chains to the vehicle.
The vehicle can take the one-way key chains to obtain the MACs that will be attached
to the safety messages. In addition, a set of commitments of one-way key chains are
sent to the vehicle, which will help the vehicle to perform source authentication and
ensure data integrity of the received safety messages after the vehicle leaves the current
RSU and before it reaches the next RSU.
Let the RSU r advertise its presence by periodically broadcasting beacons containing
the RSU’s ID idr. As soon as a vehicle newly enters the transmission range of the
RSU, the vehicle initiates anonymous mutual authentication and executes a one-way
key chain commitment distribution protocol with the RSU as illustrated in Fig. 3.6:
Step 1. An OBU with pseudo-id pid first gets the RSU’s identity information idr
from the RSU’s beacon, computes ho = H0(pid), hr = H0(idr), and uses its private key
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Algorithm 1: Anonymous key pairs generation algorithm
Data: Real identity rid
Result: Pseudo-id pid and the private key sk
begin1
The TPD first runs the following steps:2
. choose a random number r with the same length as rid, that is |r| = |rid|3
and set pid as 


pidp ≡ r ⊕ rid mod p0
pidq ≡ r mod q0
(3.1)
. based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem, compute the pseudo-id pid as4
pid ≡ pidp · cp + pidq · cq mod n0 (3.2)
where cp = q0 · (q−10 mod p0) and cq = p0 · (p−10 mod q0).
. compute the hash value H0(pid) and the private key5
sk = sH0(pid) ∈ G1 (3.3)
The TPD returns (pid, sk) to the module for performing cryptographic6
processing.
end7
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OBU pid RSU idr
compute ssk = ê(ho, hr)s
obtain current timestamp To
U = h(To, ssk)
pid,To,U−−−−−−−−−−−−→
get current timestamp Tr
check |Tr − To| ≤ ∆T
compute ssk = ê(ho, hr)s
check U ?= h(To, ssk)
c = h(Tr, ssk)⊕ k
V = h(Tr, ssk, c)
c,Tr,V←−−−−−−−−−−−
get current timestamp T ′o
check |T ′o − Tr| ≤ ∆T ′
check V ?= h(Tr, ssk, c)
k = c⊕ h(Tr, ss)
Figure 3.6: Anonymous mutual authentication between OBU and RSU
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sk = sH0(pid) = s · ho to compute their static shared key ssk,
ssk = ê(sk, hr) = ê(s · ho, hr) = ê(ho, hr)s (3.4)
Then, the OBU gets the current timestamp To, computes
U = h(To, ssk) (3.5)
and sends (pid, To, U) to the RSU.
Step 2. After receiving the OBU’s request (pid, To, U), the RSU first gains the
current timestamp Tr, and checks whether |Tr − To| ≤ ∆T , where ∆T is the expected
legal time interval for transmission delay. If it does not hold, the RSU will reject the
OBU’s request. Else, the RSU will continue running the following procedures:
• Compute ho = H0(pid), hr = H0(idr), and use private key sk = sH0(idr) to
derive the static shared key ssk as
ssk = ê(ho, sk) = ê(ho, s · hr) = ê(ho, hr)s (3.6)
• Check whether or not
U = h(To, ssk) (3.7)
If it holds, the OBU with pseudo-id pid is anonymously authenticated; otherwise
rejected.
• Randomly choose a session key k. To distribute the session key k to the OBU, c
and V are computed as follows:
c = h(Tr, ssk)⊕ k (3.8)
V = h(Tr, ssk, c) (3.9)
• Send (c, Tr, V ) back to the OBU.
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Step 3. On receiving the RSU’s response (c, Tr, V ), the OBU first gains the current
timestamp T ′o, and checks whether |T ′o−Tr| ≤ ∆T ′, where ∆T ′ is another expected legal
time interval for transmission delay. The OBU then performs the following procedures




= h(Tr, ssk, c) (3.10)




If it does hold, the RSU with identity idr is authenticated;
• Compute
k = h(Tr, ssk)⊕ c (3.12)
In the end, when the above three steps are executed normally, the anonymous
mutual authentication between the RSU and the OBU completes, and the OBU also
obtains the session key k from the RSU.
Inspired by the fact that a majority of vehicles run in a certain area everyday
and communicate with the same RSUs, the aforementioned authentication process can
further be speed up by pre-computing ssk at OBUs.
3.3.6 One-way Key Chain Commitment Distribution Phase
Between OBUs and RSUs
In this phase, the RSU will securely distribute the three parts of information to the
newly authenticated entering vehicle by using its sharing secret key k with the entering
vehicle, which is shown as follows.
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h1,h2,…,hL
(a) a one-way 
key chain
……
(b) a set S of commitments 
of used key chains
(c) a set U of commitments 
of unused key chains
Stands for a commitment of a key chain that has been assigned to a vehicle passing 
through the intersection
Stands for a commitment of a key chain that will be assigned to a vehicle entering the 
intersection later.
Figure 3.7: One-way key chain commitment distribution between OBU and RSU
1. The first part is a one-way key chain with a specific length L shown in Fig. 3.7 (a).
The vehicle, after obtaining the whole key chain, will broadcast safety messages
by attaching each of them with a short MAC tag according the one-way key chain;
2. The second part is a set S of the commitments of one-way key chains that have
been assigned to the passing vehicles. With such a mechanism, any newly entered
vehicle will be able to authenticate the safety messages from the other vehicles
previously passing through the intersection within a time window. Those vehicles
can authenticate each other on the way to an adjacent RSU since they have the
commitments corresponding to the key chains assigned to those vehicles;
3. The last part is a set U of the commitments of one-way key chains that will be
assigned to the vehicles entering the intersection later. In this case, any newly
entered vehicle will be able to authenticate the safety messages from the vehicles
entering the intersection later and coming to pass it since it holds the commit-
ments corresponding to the key chains assigned to those vehicles in advance. Also,
it ensures that any newly entered vehicle will be authenticatable by all the vehi-
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cles that passed through the intersection before and still are on the way to the
next adjacent intersection since they hold the commitment corresponding to the
key chain assigned to the newly entered vehicle in advance.
It is worth noting that every key chain commitment is associated with a unique
pseudo ID, which is sent to the entering vehicle by the RSU as well.
The size Y of the set U of the commitments of one-way key chains will be discussed
later. A key chain maintained in the RSU will become expired and erased after it is
used up by its assigned vehicle, and in this case, new key chains will be generated to
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Figure 3.8: One-way key chain pool
Note that in order to defend replay attack, the proposed protocol loosely synchro-
nizes each vehicle by having time slotted with a fixed interval denoted as ∆t. Thus,
during a specific time slot, a vehicle has to create a MAC using a correct key chain
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element for launching the safety messages, such that the safety messages can be suc-
cessfully authenticated by the other vehicles.
With the proposed IVC authentication mechanism, the value of Y determines the
maximum number of vehicles that can communicate with a vehicle passing through
the intersection before the vehicle reaches another adjacent intersection1; while the
value L determines how long a vehicle can use the assigned key chain to launch tagged
messages. Note that once a vehicle cannot reach the next RSU and be newly assigned
a key chain before running out of the whole key chain, it has to switch back to the
conventional PKI-based authentication, which is subject to more communication and
computation overhead.
Let ti denote the starting time of the ith time slot, and Ti denote the ith time slot
[ti, ti+1). The OBU key chain assignment procedure is detailed as follows.
Each RSU has a pool of one-way key chains divided into a number of sub-pools
Pi[L,K] with L rows and K columns, where i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , which is shown in Fig. 3.8,









j, j ≥ 1, hj1 is called the commitment to
the chain, and hjL = S
j is the randomly selected seed of the chain, L is the length of
the chain. Each sub-pool is responsible for N time intervals. Further, the RSU will
generate a pseudo ID PV IDj for each chain KC(L, h
j
1, S
j) by using Algorithm 1 with
its identity idr. How to determine the parameters L,K and Y will be discussed in
Section 3.3.8.
In the following descriptions, any vehicle which finishes association and anonymous
mutual authentication with the RSU in Ti is considered entering the RSU in Ti. Let
vehicle V1 enter the RSU in T1. For simple exemplification, we take L = 7, K = 8,
1For simplicity, we assume that all the vehicles, which enter the intersection after a vehicle, com-
municate with the vehicle before the vehicle enters another adjacent intersection.
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i.e., KC(7, h11, h
1
7), U = {h11} and S = {h21, · · · , h51}, as well as their corresponding
pseudo IDs PV IDi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, are sent to vehicle V1, where the size of S is Y = 4. It
is worth noting that the size of S is always kept unchanged. Without loss of generality,
we take M to denote all the information which will be sent to V1 by the RSU, which
is detailed in the next paragraph. The information exchange between the RSU and V1
is demonstrated as follows.
The RSU prepares M = {Ek(KC(7, h11, h17)),U ,S, PV ID1, · · · , PV ID5}, where
Ek(m) means the encryption of message m by using any implicit secure symmetric
encryption algorithm, i.e., DES [45], under the key of k, and generates a message
authentication code (MAC) on M||T as MACk(M||T ), where T is the time when the
RSU broadcasts the information, which is used to defeat replay attack, and k is the
shared secret key between the RSU and V1. Also, the RSU uses its private key to
sign M as σ = SignSKRSU (M||T ) by any ID-based signature scheme where SKRSU
is the corresponding private key of idr. With the ID-based signature scheme, the
workload of certificate management can be significantly reduced, and the public key
update and revocation operations can be largely simplified. Among all the known ID-
based signature schemes, the provably-secure ID-based signature scheme given in [46]
is adopted in the study since the length of the signature is significantly reduced due to
the use of bilinear pairing. The scheme is also among the most efficient ones in terms
of the complexity of signature verification, which takes only 1 pairing computation.
Afterwards, the RSU broadcasts P = 〈M, T,MACk(M||T ), σ, idr〉.






∗ Solid circle stands for normal transmission range, and dotted circle stands for
extended transmission range.
Figure 3.9: Extended intersection
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Upon receiving P , V1 uses its shared secret key k to verify MACk(M||T ) from
the RSU2. It drops P if the authentication fails. Otherwise, it continues as follows.




7)) for the assigned key chain. Afterwards, V1 stores the
received commitments in its local key commitment table along with the corresponding





its launched messages, which will be described in the next subsection. It is worth
noting that a vehicle, e.g., V2 in Fig. 3.9, is within the transmission range of V1, but
it cannot authenticate the messages from V1 since V2 has not reached the RSU to
obtain the commitment of V1’s key chain. To further solve this problem, we have the
RSU to broadcast P with a higher radiation power in order to cover at least twice of
the transmission range of a vehicle; then, as shown in Fig. 3.9, V2 can receive P and
authenticate any message from V1
3.
Subsequently, the similar procedure occurs to the vehicles entering the intersection
later except receiving a different key chain, S, U and their corresponding pseudo IDs.


















In this case, P contains KC(6, h22, h27), U = {h12, h22}, S = {h32, · · · , h62} along with their
corresponding pseudo IDs PV IDi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6, which will be sent to V2.
2Whenever receiving any packet, the receiver first checks if the timestamp found in packet is
reasonable, and if so, continue. Otherwise, the receiver drops the packet since the receiver could be
subject to replay attack.
3V2 ensures the authenticity of P by verifying RSU’s signature σ.
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In the case that multiple vehicles, e.g., V3 and V4, enter the RSU within a single




















In this case, P contains KC(5, h33, h37), U = {h13, h23, h33} and S = {h43, · · · , h73} along
with their corresponding pseudo IDs PV IDi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, which will be sent to V3.
On the other hand, the RSU will create a key chain KC(5, h43, h
4
7) shown as follows,
where P contains KC(5, h43, h47), U = {h13, h23, h33, h43} and S = {h53, · · · , h83} along with

















Next, we suppose that V5 enters the RSU at T4. The RSU will create a key chain
KC(7, h91, h
9
7) from the second sub-pool P2[7, 8] shown as follows, where P contains
KC(7, h91, h
9
7), U = {h14, h24, h34, h44, h91} and S = {h101 , · · · , h131 } along with their cor-
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It is worth noting that in order to enable IVC between the vehicles arriving at T1, T2, T3






1 , i = 5, 6, 7, 8
PV IDi = PV IDi+4, i = 5, 6, 7, 8
(3.13)
This condition can be easily achieved by generating a longer key chain for each
vehicle at the expense of more storage and higher computation required in RSUs.
3.3.7 Message Signing and Verification
Suppose vehicle V1 periodically broadcasts routine traffic related safety messages de-
noted as M1,M2, ..., Mk, and Mi is encapsulated in packet Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Further,
let packets be launched one after another with a fixed interval of 300 ms. The packet
authentication process is shown in Fig. 3.10:
t1 t2 t3
packet release interval
* hi is the key chain element encapsulated in the key release packet 
Kr_Pi , and also is the key used to calculate MAC of the data packet Pi .
time








Figure 3.10: Relationship between a key chain and the corresponding packets
In this chapter, two categories of packets, namely data packets and key release
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packet (KRP), are defined, and are denoted as Pi and kr Pi, respectively. A vehicle
periodically launches a KRP by a fixed time δ after the previous data packet is released.
Source O Receivers R1, · · · , Rn
Generate Message Mj , j ≥ 1
Compute MAChj (Mj ||Tj)
Pj = 〈PV ID, Mj ,MAChj (Mj ||Tj), Tj , index = j〉
Pj−−−−−−−−−→
Buffer Pj
Wait for δ seconds




(i is the last successfully received key)
If no, drop it
If yes, continue. Verify
MAChj (Mj ||Tj) ?= MACkj (Mj ||Tj)
If so, accept and consume Mj
Otherwise drop it
∗ ki and kj are the hash elements in kr Pi and kr Pj respectively.
Figure 3.11: The proposed security protocol
The proposed security scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3.11. For an arbitrary sender
O, it generates the MAC tags of the messages using hj as the encryption keys, where
1 ≤ j ≤ n. Therefore, the data packet to be sent has the following format:
Pj = 〈PV ID, Mj,MAChj(Mj||Tj), Tj, index = j〉, j ≥ 1 (3.14)
where Mj is the safety message, PV ID is the pseudo ID of vehicle O; Tj is the time
when the sender sends the data packet, which is used to defeat replay attack.
Then, the sender O prepares the key release packet, which has the following format:
kr Pj = 〈PV ID, hj, T ′j , index = j〉, j ≥ 1, (3.15)
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where hj is used to generate the MAC tag for message Mj, T
′
j = Tj.
Delayed authentication is performed in the sense that when receiving data packet
Pj, j ≥ 1, the receivers simply put the received messages in the buffer without trying
to verify them. As soon as the next key release packet kr Pj arrives, the receivers start
to verify the previous data packet. At first, the receivers check the legitimacy of the
received key chain element, which can be done by checking if the following equation
holds:
hj−index(hj) = c (3.16)
where hj is included in the key release packet kr Pj, and c and index are from the
entry corresponding to PV ID, which is found in its local key commitment table. If
the Eq. 3.16 does not hold, the packet kr Pj is dropped along with data packet Pj;
otherwise, the receivers start to validate the data packet Pj by checking if
MACkj(Mj||Tj) = MAChj(Mj||Tj), (3.17)
where Mj, Tj and MAChj(Mj||Tj) are the previously buffered values of the data packet
Pj, kj is the key chain element in kr Pj. If the verification succeeds, Pj is accepted and
consumed by the application layer, and then, in the entry corresponding to PV ID, the
receivers update the second and third fields with index and hj along with a new timer
for the last field; otherwise, Pj is dropped.
In summary, the proposed protocol can achieve the same guarantee on the message
integrity, anonymity, and authenticity as the traditional PKI-based protocols, while
taking much less computation and communication overhead in the IVC authentication
since only hash function and MAC operations are required. In spite of the anonymity
assurance, the scheme can well achieve conditional traceability for the authorities in
case of any traffic dispute. The conditional anonymity is due to the fact that all the
accepted messages are uniquely tied to an anonymous pseudo ID created by an RSU,
while this pseudo ID can be further tied to an anonymous pseudo ID of its sender. Thus,
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by checking these two unique anonymous pseudo IDs, the authorities can trace the
unique real world identity of the message sender as that can be done in the traditional
PKI-based protocols, which will be detailed in Section 3.4.1.
3.3.8 Parameters Selection
Determine the parameter L
Without loss of generality, one RSU is allocated at an intersection, and each inter-
section has four adjacent intersections. As exemplified in Fig. 3.12, RSU0 is next to
the intersections where RSUi is located, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Further, each street is two
way road with two lanes; and each vehicle periodically broadcasts its routine safety










Figure 3.12: Considered road architecture
The length L of each key chain can be determined
L = drmax/0.3e+ N (3.18)
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, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, rmax = max{r1, r2, r3, r4}. li and vi are the length and speed
limit of the street from the intersection to its adjacent intersections, respectively.
Parameter Selection for Y
The value of Y determines the maximum number of vehicles that can communicate with
a vehicle passing through the intersection before the vehicle reaches another adjacent
intersection. Suppose vehicle arrivals at an intersection follow a Poisson distribution,
that is:
P{X = n} = λ
n
n!
e−λ, n = 0, 1, 2, · · · , λ > 0 (3.19)
where X is the number of entering vehicles to the RSU within a time interval, λ is the
expected number of entering vehicles to the RSU during an interval.
Based on the road architecture in Fig. 3.12, vehicles can arrive at an intersection
simultaneously from different directions. Hence, we have the total number no of the
vehicles entering the intersection after a vehicle, which entered the intersection before,




nP{X = n} (3.20)
For simplicity, all the vehicles, which enter the intersection after a vehicle, commu-
nicate with the vehicle before the vehicle enters another intersection. Therefore, the
parameter Y can be
Y = dnoe (3.21)
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Parameter Selection for K
K is defined as the sum of Y and the number of total key chains needed for vehicles




nP{X = n}e+ Y (3.22)
3.3.9 Discussions
Security Requirement and Key Disclosure Delay δ
To defend the message forgery attack, the key disclosure delay should be longer than the
time for a message to travel from the source to all the recipients within its transmission
range. If any receiver r can receive the released key before the original data packet
arrives at another receiver, e.g., r, receiver r who holds the key can forge a message
by generating a valid MAC tag to this message and sending the tagged message to r.
This situation can be avoided by properly choosing the key disclosure delay δ. In the
vehicular communications with IEEE 802.11p, since the longest transmission range is
about 1000 m [3], δ should be slightly greater than the time duration for a message to
travel for 1000 m in the wireless channel. In [4], the communication latency is identified
as about 10 ms. In our protocol, therefore, δ is set to be 80 ms which is about 8 times
of the communication latency for resolving the aforementioned concerns. Note that
before performing the normal message authentication process, a receiver has to check
the validity of the message by being aware of which time interval that the message
belongs to and whether the corresponding key has been released already. If it is not
true, the message is dropped without further processing.
Resilience to Message Loss
Inherent from TESLA, our protocol is packet loss tolerant. In other words, no action
will be taken when a data packet is lost. If the KRP kr Pi is lost, the legitimacy
Secure and Privacy-Preserving Vehicular Communications 52
of the previous message can still be verified upon receiving kr Pj with j > i. The
broken key chain can be reconnected by applying the hash function h(x) j − i times
and obtaining hi = h
j−i(hj). Also, the receiver checks if h(hi) = hi−1, where hi−1 is
the last successfully received key. If so, the newly arrived key value hj is acceptable.
However, if multiple continuous packets are lost such that the time to wait for the new
KRP is longer than the maximum tolerable message delay, Mj is neglected. In this
case, the subsequent messages can still be authenticated when new data packets arrive.
Time Synchronization
Similar to TESLA, the security offered by the proposed protocol heavily relies on loose
time synchronization among the vehicles, which can easily be achieved by some time
synchronization protocols [29, 47, 48]. Currently, there are two methods to synchro-
nize the senders and the receivers, namely direct time synchronization and indirect
time synchronization, respectively [49]. By considering the high mobility of vehicles in
VANETs and the loose time synchronization requirement, our protocol performs a di-
rect synchronization between the RSU and each entering vehicle, while taking indirect
time synchronization where all the vehicles in a group are synchronized the external
time reference given by the RSU. In specific, when a vehicle enters an RSU, it will be
synchronized with the RSU first, and then the vehicle will be given a time reference
for slotting time domain. On the other hand, the enumeration of the time slots will
be performed through the local clock of the vehicle. Since the residential time for a
vehicle is expected to be no more than a few tens minutes, the accuracy of the clock
will not be a concern.
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3.4 Performance Analysis
3.4.1 Security Analysis
In this subsection, the security of the proposed protocol is analyzed.
• Data source (or origin) authentication: In the application scenario considered in
the study, data source (or origin) authentication is the assurance for the receivers
that received messages originated from a legitimate sender that is claimed to
be, but the identity of the sender is unknown to the receivers. In the proposed
protocol, a sender, which is also known as the leader (or the header) of a group,
always broadcasts a data packet first, which contains a routine traffic-related
message and its MAC as well as a pseudo ID of the sender. Then, the key used to
calculate the MAC of the message is released in a key release packet after a fixed
delay, which is pe-determined to be larger than the maximum transmission delay.
Upon reception of the key release packet, the message recipients use the key from
the received key release packet to verify data authenticity by recomputing the
MAC using the same algorithm and comparing it with the one from previously
received data packet.
In order to forge a packet, the attacker needs to either guess the correct key or
generate fake data packet with a MAC obtained from a fake key. The former one
is a brute-force attack or an exhaustive key search, which simply does not work
if the MAC algorithm is secure, such as MD5 and SHA-1. The latter fails due to
the use of a one-way key chain in the proposed protocol, where the chain element
serves as the secret keys for computing the MACs of data packets in the opposite
order of that a key chain has been generated. If a receiver receives the fake key, the
receiver can easily identify that the key is incorrect by checking the relationship
between this key and previously successfully received keys (also known as the key
commitment of the currently received key) in the key chain. Definitely, it results
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in verification failure of the received key. The security depends on the secure
characteristics of one-way hash function used to generate one-way key chain.
• Data Integrity: Integrity prevents the unauthorized modification of messages in
transit. The integrity of considered applications is violated when the correctness
and appropriateness of the content of message is modified, destroyed or deleted.
Data integrity is assured that the messages from a sender is protected by either
using an ID-based signature scheme or TESLA-based self-authenticating one-way
chains, which are assigned by an RSU along the roads, as the key to compute the
MACs over the original messages.
• Data source privacy: The privacy of the data source is well protected because
each vehicle is using random pseudo ID to broadcast a message by either using an
ID-based signature scheme or TESLA-based self-authenticating one-way chains.
• Traceability: We assume that each local government region has its own data
center, which periodically collects ID pairs from the RSUs in its domain. An
ID pair is composed of two components: one is a vehicle’s pseduo ID pid, and
another is a dynamic pseduo ID PVID, which is assigned to the vehicles by the
RSUs. When the authorities have to reveal the real identities of the message
senders, the authorities firstly find the real ID of the RSU by using PVID,
(PV ID mod q0)⊕ (PV ID mod p0) (3.23)
Then, the authorities contact the local government region, which will look up in
its database for the pid and sends the pid back to the authorities. Afterwards,
the authorities can reveal the real identities of the message senders as follows.
(pid mod q0)⊕ (pid mod p0) (3.24)
• Replay attack resilience: With a replay attack, an adversary simply replays the
intercepted message, which is originally launched by a legitimate user in order
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to trick the receivers into believing that they are receiving the message from the
legitimate user. Obviously, this attack does not work because a timestamp is
embedded into each packet to verify its freshness.
3.4.2 Efficiency Analysis
In this subsection, simulation is conducted to verify the efficiency of the proposed secu-
rity protocol using ns-2 [50]. We are interested in the system performance concerning
with the average Packet Delay (PD) and average Packet Loss Ratio (PLR), which is
further compared with several traditional public key based security protocols [19, 21].
The communication overhead is also investigated for the proposed protocol. For the
PLR, we only consider the packet loss caused by security mechanisms instead of lossy
wireless channels. The road system considered in the study is the traffic scenario on a
straight bi-directional six lane city road, where the vehicles are moving with a speed
fluctuation uniformly distributed in a range of ±5 km/hr centered at the road speed
limit that ranges from 5-30 m/s. An intersection is located every 600 meters along the
road, where one RSU is installed at each intersection. Other simulation parameters are
listed in Table 3.3.
We first simulate the message transmission delay through the wireless channel.
Because most of the transmission delay is incurred by wireless channel contention,
which means the longest transmission time happens when the density of the traffic
is the highest, we simulate the crowded traffic scenario the communication range and
inter-vehicle distance as 300 m and 5 m, respectively. The result of the simulation
shows the longest transmission delay is around 6.467 ms. Hence, the key disclosure
delay δ in the later experiments is conservatively set as 80 ms, which is much larger
than the actual delay. Thus, the absolute security can be ensured. We then run two sets
of simulations. The first set of simulations investigates the impact of the vehicle moving
speed to PLR and PD, whereas the second investigates the impact of vehicle density
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Table 3.3: Simulation configuration
simulation area 3000m× 50m
Communication range 300 m
Simulation time 100 s
Channel bandwidth 6 Mbs
Pause time 0 s
Payload for OBU message 200 bytes
Group key verification delay 10.7 ms
ECDSA-224 signing delay 2.92 ms
ECDSA-224 verification delay 3.87 ms
on the two performance metrics. The delay induced by any cryptographic operation in
the simulation is automatically taken as delay in the ns-2 simulation according to the
measurement of those algorithms based on cryptographic library MIRACL [51].
Impact of Vehicle Moving Speed
In the first set of simulations, v (i.e., the average speed of the vehicles) is changed
from 5m/s ∼ 30m/s (18km/hr ∼ 108km/hr). The initial inter-vehicle distance is 30
meters. The simulation results on PD and PLR are shown in Figs. 3.13 and 3.14. It
can be seen that the speed variation does not affect the PD and PLR. According to [4],
the maximum allowable message latency is around 100ms to meet the human beings’
reaction. Thus, all these protocols can meet this requirement. On the other hand, for
PLR, SERP 3 yields much lower packet loss ratio compared with that of PKI-based
protocols under this normal vehicle density.
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Figure 3.13: Relationship of PD and vehicle moving speed































Figure 3.14: Relationship of PLR and vehicle moving speed
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Impact of Vehicle Density
























Figure 3.15: Relationship of PD and vehicle density
In the second set of simulations, the impact of vehicle density on PD and PLR is
studied. From Fig. 3.15, it can be seen that SERP 3 has higher but acceptable packet
delay than PKI-based protocols. In addition, the packet delay for all the protocols does
not vary much with the increase of the vehicle density. From Fig. 3.16, the traditional
public key based protocols suffer from a much higher packet loss ratio when the vehicle
density is larger, which makes them not scalable in practical scenario. On the other
hand, the proposed SERP 3 protocol maintains stable PLR and is not affected by the
increase of the vehicle density.
Communication overhead
Next, the communication overhead is investigated for the proposed protocol. We as-
sume that ECDSA-224 is adopted for PKI-based scheme and the size of a signing
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Figure 3.16: Relationship of PLR and vehicle density
certificate for an OBU is 125 bytes [5]. Further, suppose that MAC algorithm adopted
in SERP 3 is constructed from MD5, which is a widely used cryptographic hash func-
tion with a 128-bit hash value. For PKI-based scheme, the communication overhead
includes the following two components: (1) the digital signature and (2) public key cer-
tificate. For the proposed symmetric-key cryptography based protocol, the communica-
tion overhead comes from the following three components: (1) message authentication
code, (2) pseudo identity, and (3) key release packet. Fig. 3.17 shows the comparison
of communication overhead for PKI-based scheme, GSIS, and the proposed protocol.
It is observed that the proposed protocol has the least overhead compared to the other
two protocols.





Figure 3.17: The comparison of communication overhead
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a security infrastructure for VANET in which a
concept of ePermit is defined to serve as a proof of an authorized driver to drive the
vehicle and to activate the security system based on proxy signature. Furthermore,
we have proposed a novel SERP 3 security protocol for achieving efficient and secure
inter-vehicular communications. With the symmetric key based scheme and delayed
authentication, the packet loss ratio can be significantly reduced without much increas-
ing the packet delay. We have conducted extensive analysis and simulation to verify the
proposed protocol, which demonstrated that the proposed protocol cannot only meet
the various security requirements and the driver’s conditional privacy requirement, but
also achieve high efficiency in terms of packet overhead and computation latency.
Chapter 4
Efficient and Cooperative Message
Validation Protocol
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we introduced SERP 3, a secure and efficient RSU-aided
privacy-preserving protocol. However, RSU may not exist in some situations, for ex-
ample, in rural areas or in the early stage deployment phase of VANET, where unfor-
tunately, SERP 3 is not suitable. In this chapter, we solve the problem from a different
perspective by letting vehicles cooperatively verify messages. We propose a complemen-
tary Efficient and Cooperative Message Validation Protocol, called ECMVP, where each
vehicle probabilistically validates a certain percentage of its received messages based
on its own computing capacity and then reports any invalid messages detected by it.
Computing power is a precious asset for each individual vehicle. Besides for message
validation, it also can be used for many purposes, such as infotainment dissemination for
drivers and passengers including listening to mp3. The higher the vehicles’ verification
probability is, the higher the computing cost is. However, a vehicle also wants to
detect any invalid message because it could be at risk if it consumes an invalid message.
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Therefore, as for a vehicle cooperative message validation protocol, it is desired to find
the minimum verification probability needed for each vehicle to assure adequate chance





















Figure 4.1: A group of vehicles which are divided by v1 into two regions
However, there exists a reliability issue with regard to reporting mechanism used
above. To illustrate the problem, as shown in Fig. 4.1, an example of vehicular network
is used where two transmission ranges are defined and it is assumed that there exists
a malicious vehicle v1. One transmission range, Transmission 1, covers vehicles behind
v1, and another one, Transmission 2, covers vehicles ahead of v1. We assume that v1
sends out a bogus message. Upon receiving the bogus message, v5 verifies the message
and discovers that it is invalid. Then, v5 broadcasts an accusation to alert the other
nearby vehicles. However, since v2 and v3 are not in the transmission range of v5, v2
and v3 will miss the accusation from v5. Therefore, in order to ensure that vehicle v2
and v3 also receive an accusation, in this case that there should at least two vehicles
that validate v1’s message, where the two vehicles are in the Transmission range 1 and
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2, respectively.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we present the
basic idea behind cooperative probabilistic message validation. Then, a detail reliability
analysis is presented in Section 4.3. Afterwards, we discuss a solution to misbehavior
resilience in Section 4.4. Finally, we give the summary in Section 4.5.
4.2 Probabilistic Verification
Without loss of generality, a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)-based secure and privacy-
preserving framework is built for vehicular communications, where each vehicle main-
tains a large set of public/private key pairs and their corresponding anonymous public-
key certificates including pseudonyms as their identities [20]. We assume that vehicles
are homogeneous and have the same computing power. Also, each vehicle can only
process up to N received message per second based on its computing power. As we
mentioned before, under some circumstances of high traffic density, for example, traf-
fic jams are common on the road, a vehicle may not be able to validate its received
messages fast enough if PKI is used to ensure security and privacy preservation, which
results in the loss of message. Instead of letting vehicles validate all their received
messages, vehicles validate any received message with a probability p. Also, for achiev-
ing the aforementioned cooperative probabilistic message validation mechanism, every
vehicle maintains one table, as shown in the following, consisting of received messages
but unverified and a timer which controls how long the corresponding message needs
to wait before it can be consumed by the receiver. If the timer hits 0, the entry will be
removed and the corresponding stored message will be consumed by the vehicle. How-
ever, if a message is accused bogus before timeout, it will be discarded and removed
from the table.
Received message Timer
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Data: Vi received a message Mj and its corresponding signature σj from Vj
Result: True if σj is valid; False if σj is invalid
for each vehicle Vi that received 〈Mj, σj〉 do1
Vi chooses either 1 with probability p or 0 with probability 1− p;2
if Vi chose 1 then3
Vi verifies σj;4








Vi waits ∆t ms for other vehicles’ accusations, which tell whether σj is13
valid or not;
if there no such accusation then14
return True;15
else16
Vi received such an accusation from Vk;17
Vi verifies σj;18








Algorithm 2: Probabilistic Verification Algorithm
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The details of cooperative probabilistic message validation are shown in Alg. 2. In
Alg. 1, Vi, Vj, Vk are three vehicles that can one-hop communicate with each other,
where i, j, k = 1, . . . , n and i 6= j 6= k. When Vi receives a message 〈Mj, σj〉 sent by Vj
where σj is the signature of Vj on the message Mj, Vi determines whether to verify the
signature σj with probability p (we name p the verification probability). If Vi determines
to verify σj, and σj is proved to be valid, Vi keeps silence and consumes Mj. On the
other hand, if Vi verifies σj and discovers that σj is invalid, Vi informs other neighbors
that 〈Mj, σj〉 is an invalid message by one-hop broadcasting an accusation 〈IDMj , σi〉,
where IDMj is used to uniquely identify the message 〈Mj, σj〉, for example, a hash value
of 〈Mj, σj〉 , and σi is the signature signed by Vi on IDMj . Otherwise, if Vi determines
not to verify σj, Vi waits a predefined ∆t ms for other neighbors’ accusations on this
message. If Vi receives an invalidity accusation 〈IDMj , σk〉 from Vk within ∆t, Vi knows
that 〈Mj, σj〉 may be invalid. To ensure 〈Mj, σj〉’s invalidity, Vi verifies 〈Mj, σj〉 by
itself. If Vi does not receive any accusation from other neighbors within ∆t, Vi treats
〈Mj, σj〉 as a valid message by default. It is worth noting that ∆t should be greater
than the total time of verifying two signatures and the transmission delay between two
vehicles.
4.3 Reliability Analysis
This section discusses how to guarantee that the invalidity accusation of a specific
message Mi will always be received by all neighboring vehicles of the malicious sender.
Intuitively, at least one vehicle should work as the candidate to verify the message Mi,
namely the probability that there exists at least one vehicle, which will verify Mi, is as
close to 1 as possible. However, from the communication range’s point of view, only
one vehicle that verifies a message is not enough. For example, in Fig. 4.1, suppose that
V3 and V4 are V1’s neighbors. V1 sends a bogus message and V3 determines to verify it
while V4 not. Since V4 is not in the communication range of V3, it cannot receive the
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accusation from V3. Therefore, without loss of generality, there should exist at least
two vehicles verifying a message sent by a vehicle, say V . One vehicle should physically
be in front of V , while the other should be behind V .
Let n be the total number of neighboring vehicles of V (or referred to as traffic
load), i be the number of neighbors in front of V , n − i be the number of neighbors
behind V . Notice that the value of n can be known by each vehicle because each
vehicle periodically broadcasts its traffic related information (e.g., a pseudo identity
and a position) every 300 ms. Suppose that V ’s neighbors are uniformly distributed
around V and each vehicle’s position is independent. Let Ai be the event that there
are i vehicles in front of V and n− i vehicles behind V . Let B be the event that there
are two vehicles that will verify a message sent by V , one of which is in front of V and









where Pr{B|Ai} = (1−(1−p)i)·(1−(1−p)n−i), and (1−p)i is the probability that none
of i vehicles in front of V will verify a message sent by V , 1− (1− p)i is the probability
that there is at least one vehicle that will verify the message, and 1 − (1 − p)n−i is
the probability that there is at least one vehicle behind V that will verify the message,













)n. Our objective is to make Pr{B} as close to
1 as possible with minimum p. In other words, each vehicle aims to use a minimum
computing resource while makes sure that any invalid message can still be detected.
Fig. 4.2 shows the relationship among Pr{B}, p, and n. It can be seen that Pr{B}
increases as either p or n increases. The increasing gradient is rather sharp. Pr{B}
quickly approaches to 1 even if p is a small value when traffic load is large (e.g.,
Pr{B} = 99.98% when p = 15%, n = 120). Moreover, we can conclude from Fig. 4.2
that when Pr{B} is fixed, p is inversely proportional to n. In particular, when n is
Chapter 4. Efficient and Cooperative Message Validation Protocol 67
large, p should be small, and vice versa. Our objective is to change p to make Pr{B}
approach to 1 as much as possible. On the other hand, under the condition that Pr{B}
has sufficiently approached to 1, we try to make p as small as possible because a small
value of p implies that a vehicle can potentially save processor (e.g., CPU) resources



















Figure 4.2: Pr{B} vs. traffic load and verification probability
In order for each vehicle to choose an appropriate p under different values of n, we
use the parameter k = n · p to leverage the inversely proportional relationship between
p and n. Notice that k presents the average number of signatures that a vehicle verifies
every 300 ms because n is the total number of neighbors each of which sends a message
every 300 ms, and p is the verification probability. If we can find a suitable k, then the
corresponding p can be determined. Based on Eq. 4.1, we can obtain the relationship
between Pr{B} and n in terms of different k as shown in Fig. 4.3. From Fig. 4.3(d),
we can see that Pr{B} with k = 25 is sufficiently close to 1 no matter how large n is.
Therefore, we conclude that in ECMVP we can set k as a constant value, i.e., 25. Since
k is fixed, p can be computed as k/n (that is, 25/n). In other words, we can change p
according to n. For example, a vehicle V having 50 neighbors receives a message Mi,
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Figure 4.3: Pr{B} vs. traffic load
and V will verify Mi with the probability of 25/50. Notice that V knows the number
of its neighbors. In case that n is less than 25, let p be equal to 100%. It is worth
noting that k cannot be larger than the vehicle V ’s verification capability, which is the
maximum number of verifications that the vehicle V can process.
4.4 Misbehavior Resilience
Misbehavior or selfish behavior is an inherent attack in cooperative networks. In our
scheme, there are two kinds of misbehaviors: 1) some vehicles do not verify any signa-
ture and instead they just wait for other honest nodes’ accusations; 2) some vehicles
verify signatures but they do not send any accusation to other vehicles. Previously
related studies have addressed misbehavior issues. Zhang et al. in [52] introduce a
credit based scheme that encourages nodes forwarding packets in mobile ad hoc net-
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works. Zhang et al. in [53] employ a tamper-proof device in vehicular sensor networks,
and the tamper-proof device can trustworthily generate pseudo random identities for a
vehicle. Although these schemes can prevent misbehavior, the overhead is high (such
as credit management in [52]).





























Figure 4.4: Pr{B} vs. traffic load given different k and c
Based on ECMVP, we can increase the value of k (and the corresponding p) to
eliminate the effect caused by misbehaving vehicles. Assume that the total percentage
of misbehaving vehicles in VANETs is not more than 50%, which is similar to that in
[54–56]. This assumption is reasonable because in reality misbehaving vehicles make up
only a small portion of the total vehicles. Let c represent the percentage of misbehaving
vehicles in vehicular networks. In this case, if a vehicle has n neighbors, there would
exist (1 − c) · n vehicles that apply ECMVP and c · n misbehaving vehicles. As such,
based on Eq. 4.1, Pr{B} equals 1 + (1 − p)(1−c)·n − 2 · (1 − p/2)(1−c)·n. Fig. 4.4(a)
shows that Pr{B} decreases as c increases. The ideal result is to keep Pr{B} as the
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case where k = 25, c = 0.0 (as shown Fig. 4.3(d)). Our solution is to increase the
parameter k, i.e., let k = 50. Fig. 4.4(b) indicates that the Pr{B} with k = 50, c = 0.5
approximates the Pr{B} with k = 25, c = 0.0. Therefore, ECMVP with k = 50 can
effectively eliminate the negative effects of misbehaving vehicles but with the cost of
increasing computational cost.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a protocol complementary to SERP 3 to address
the situation where RSU doesn’t exist in VANET, which is possible in the early stage
deployment phase of VANET. The proposed protocol not only retains the security and
privacy preservation properties inherited from PKI-based solutions, but also solves the
scalability issue.
Chapter 5
Secure VANET-based Road Traffic
Control System
5.1 Introduction
In the previously chapters, we have introduced a security architecture as well as a secure
and efficient RSU-aided privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular communications. The
ultimate goal of vehicular communication network is to develop vehicle safety/non-
safety related applications to improve road safety and facilitate traffic management
and infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers. In next two chapters, we
will propose two vehicle applications to exploit advantages of vehicular communications
while taking those application specific threats into consideration.
It is a commonly used approach by installing a temporary traffic sign to assist
road traffic control so as to direct vehicular and pedestrian traffic to circumvent an
accident scene or road disruption area. For example, when there is a car accident on
the highway, it is necessary for the road authorities to have warning signs posted to
warn drivers to take caution when they are approaching. Nevertheless, even though
there is a warning sign ahead, it could still not be completely solving since some drivers
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may ignore the warning sign due to many reasons such as bad weather. In addition,
when there is an unexpected event on the roads, road authorities may not be notified
in time to set up the warning signs. The time span between the occurrence of the
accident event and the installation of warning signs becomes the most dangerous to the
public, in which the subsequent vehicles could easily be affected and led into danger.
This problem is worsened due to the fact that many car accidents may not be reported
in a timely fashion. Thus, it will be with utmost importance to have a temporary
emergency sign available at the scene as early as when the incidents occurs even before
the road authorities are notified. Hence, it becomes a very challenging task for achieving
dynamic and light-weigh traffic control in the efforts of how to rapidly and accurately
disseminate road conditions information to the subsequent traffic, particularly to those
drivers within the affected geographic area.
Recent advances in wireless technology promise a new approach to facilitating road
safety, traffic management, and infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers,
such as Approaching Emergency Vehicle Warning [4]. An increasing interest has been
raised recently on the applications of roadside-to-vehicle communications (RVC) and
Inter-vehicle communications (IVC), aiming to improve the driving safety and traffic
management while providing drivers and passengers with Internet access at the same
time. One of the main challenges in launching VANETs into practical roadside traffic
control systems is on how to identify and defend malicious abuses, security attacks, and
privacy violations. Thus, this chapter introduces a Secure VANET-based Road Traffic
Control System, or called SVRTCS, in order to circumvent vehicles safely through the
areas with abnormal situations while ensuring the security and privacy of the users
from various threats. The proposed scheme not only enhances traveler safety but also
minimizes capacity restrictions due to any unusual situation. The major advantages of
our system lie in the following three aspects: 1) the proposed system can achieve secure
road traffic control by way of VANETs; 2) the system contains a wrong-way driving
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warning system to identify wrong-way driving by way of vehicular communication and
multilayer perceptron (MLP) network technologies. The wrong-way driving warning
system is devised to predict the possible future direction of a vehicle and then warn the
driver about potential wrong way driving to prevent possible head-on collisions; and
3) the proposed system introduces a new implementation of RSUs, namely temporary
RSUs (tRSUs). An tRSU is automatically formed by a vehicle involved in an abnor-
mal situation, such as car accident, to serve as temporary RSU to improve the safety
around the scene of the accident.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. As a preliminary of the pro-
posed scheme, multilayer perceptron classifier is presented in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3,
the considered system model is presented along with a number of severe security and
privacy threats in the application scenario. In Section 5.4, the proposed secure VANET-
based road traffic control system is presented, and the security and efficiency of the
proposed mechanism are analyzed and discussed in section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6
summarizes the chapter.
5.2 Multilayer Perceptron Classifier
As a fundamental enabling technique of the proposed system, the preliminary knowl-
edge about multilayer perceptron classifier is briefly introduced in this section.
An artificial neural network is initially inspired by the human brain and attempts
to electronically simulate the human brain’s ability to achieve the corresponding func-
tions. Neurons, as basic elements in a neural network, work in unison. Each neuron
that receives signals transferred from its frontward-neighbor neurons combines all in-
formation together, performs a general nonlinear activation operation, such as sigmoid
transfer function, and then delivers the result to its backward-neighbor neurons. The
link connecting two neurons is given a weight, which signifies how closely two neu-
ral connect. All weights can converge on a steady value after the neural network is
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trained. Thus, a neural network in which neurons are appropriately interconnected
along with weights can achieve an “intelligent” mission, such as pattern classifica-
tion, clustering/categorization, function approximation, prediction/forecasting, opti-
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Figure 5.1: A three-layer perceptron network
Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) neural network, as the most popular neural network,
is widely used for pattern classification today, and can find arbitrarily complex decision
boundaries and represent any Boolean function [65]. Given enough neurons and appro-
priate layers, an MLP can efficiently approximate any desired function and achieve a
great accuracy. The MLP network consists of multiple layers, including the input layer,
hidden layer (which contains one or more sub-layers), and an output layer, as shown in
Fig. 5.1. The number of neurons of an input layer is determined by the number of di-
mensions of input data space. The number of sub-layers of a hidden layer and neurons
in each sub-layer depends on the complexity of classification. Roughly speaking, the
more sub-layers and neurons the hidden layer has, the more accurate the result of the
classifications is. However, as the number of neurons increases, the time consumed on
Chapter 5. Secure VANET-based Road Traffic Control System 75
training the network increases as well. Thus, in most cases, a tradeoff is required. For
classification purpose, the number of neurons of an output layer is equal to the number
of classes, and each neuron stands for each class. There are two phases needed for an
MLP as a classifier, a classification phase and a training phase.
The objective of a training phase is to tune the weight of each link in the network
by way of a large number of input training samples and their corresponding desired
outputs, so that these weights can well contribute to a good classification result. Com-
pared with the classification process, the training process is relatively complicated. The
most typical training algorithm is the back-propagation algorithm [65]. The algorithm
is used to calculate the gradient of the error of the network. Through the learning pro-
cess, the errors propagate backwards from output layer to input layer, and the weights
of the network are modified to minimize any error that might happen next time. In
the classification phase, from the input layer to the output layer, each neuron sums up
all data coming from the neuron of the previous intermediate neighbor layer. Before
summation, each data is multiplied by a weight, which is obtained from a training
process. At the output layer, the neuron having the largest summation value indicates
that the input data belongs to the neuron (class).
5.3 System Model
In this section, we introduce the system model considered in this chapter, followed by
a detailed illustration of several identified severe attacks against the system. Then, we
propose a VANET-based secure road traffic control system.
5.3.1 System Overview
As shown in Fig. 5.2, when an incident happens, the cars involved in the incident
automatically form an tRSU based on a trigger event, such as turning on the emergency
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Figure 5.2: Road traffic control at a car accident scene
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lights and trig of the airbag. Also, we assume there does not exist any RSU within
the transmission range of the accident scene. Otherwise, this RSU will automatically
become an ”accident ahead” warning RSU, which alerts any approaching drivers to the
hazard. After the tRSU are formed by the vehicles involved in the accident, all the
vehicles approaching the scene will receive the warning message from the tRSU and
take some proper actions.
The above mechanism is straightforward and expected to effectively mitigate the
potential danger caused by the roadside accident events. However, this may suffer from
some malicious attacks, such as fake RSU attack. With such an attack, the adversary
may set up a malicious tRSU to fool other drivers by providing a fake accident ahead
message to the others such that it can manipulate to get a better traffic condition.
Inspired by the fact that a network is insecure if the majority of nodes become malicious,
we assume that k is an oracle number, and any set of k drivers supports one tRSU, the
tRSU will be taken as authentic RSU and then will be trusted by all the other drivers.
Hence, the initiator(s) should get enough supports from other drivers in order to evolve
into a trusted tRSU. Therefore, if an approaching driver witnesses the accident, he/she
should support the accident victims to evolve into a trusted tRSU by sending a support
message. Afterwards, the witness may phone the road authorities straight away and
help the casualties. If the witness chooses to continue traveling, the car accident will
be reported automatically to the road authorities when the witness approaches the first
RSU that he/she meets along the road.
5.3.2 Threat Models
As a special implementation of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), a VANET inherits
all the known and unknown security weaknesses that are associated with MANETs,
and could be subject to many security threats. In this section, we mainly discuss
a number of application-specific security and privacy threats. A whole and compre-
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hensive description of general security and privacy threats in VANETs is available in
Section 1.3.1.
Privacy Threats
• Personal information protection: The personal information of drivers involved
in an accident shall be protected unless the information is legally required or
permitted.
Security Threats
• Bogus road control message attack: The adversary may put up a fake or illegal
tRSU to send fake road control messages to meet a specific purpose. For example,
one may send a fake road closed message to the others so as to get a better traffic
condition.
• Sybil attack: In the application scenario considered in the study, the sybil attack
is the one in which an adversary generates a large number of pseudonymous
entities and use them to help a fake tRSU to evolve into a trusted tRSU.
5.4 Secure VANET-based Road Traffic Control Sys-
tem
The proposed secure VANET-based road traffic control system is composed of three
components: system initialization, tRSUs formation, and wrong-way warning.
5.4.1 System Initialization
Given a security parameter k, a 5-tuple (q,G1,G2, ê, P ) is generated by running Gen(k).
The Ministry of Transportation (MTO) acts as a trusted authority (TA) and chooses
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two random numbers s1, s2 ∈ Z∗q as the master private keys. Then, the TA computes
the corresponding public keys Ppub1 = s1P and Ppub2 = s2P . Let f, h,H be three secure
cryptographic hash functions, where f : G1 → Z∗q, h : {0, 1}∗×Z∗q → Z∗q, and H : G1×
Z∗q → G1. Then, the system parameters are params=(q,G1,G2, ê, P, Ppub1, Ppub2, f, h, H).
Further, in the system, each vehicle is assumed to be preloaded with a tamper-
proof device, which is a device such that an attacker cannot extract any data stored
in the device [19, 61]. When a vehicle registers itself to the TA, the TA will assign a
unique identity ID ∈ Z∗q and a password pwd to the vehicle. Also, the TA will inject
the tamper-proof device with 〈ID, pwd〉, params=(q,G,GT , ê, P, Ppub1, Ppub2, f, h, H)
and master private key (s1, s2). The password pwd is required in the authentication
process by the tamper-proof device. Thus, an attacker cannot take advantage of the
tamper-proof device even if the vehicle is stolen.
Then, in order to achieve privacy preservation, each vehicle uses the tamper-proof
device to generate the pseudo-identity based key. Fig. 5.3 gives the flowchart of key
generation, and the detailed steps are listed as follows.
Step 1. When the vehicle inputs its identity ID and password pwd, the tamper-proof
device first authenticates the inputs. If the authentication passes, the tamper-proof
device proceeds the next step; otherwise returns ⊥ and terminates the procedure.
Step 2. The tamper-proof device generates a random number r ∈ Z∗q, and computes




PID1 = rP ∈ G1
PID2 = ID · f(rPpub1) mod q
(5.1)
Step 3. The tamper-proof device then generates the corresponding one-time identity-




SK1 = s1 · PID1 ∈ G1
SK2 = s2 ·H(PID1, P ID2) ∈ G1
(5.2)




PID1 = rP, PID2 = ID · f(rPpub1) mod q
SK1 = s1 · PID1, SK2 = s2 · H(PID1, P ID2)




Figure 5.3: Pseudo-identity based key generation in tamper-proof device.
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Step 4. The tamper-proof device outputs the pseudo-identity PID = (PID1, P ID2)
and the corresponding private key SK = (SK1, SK2) to the vehicle.
Note that the pseudo-identity PID and the private key SK can be generated offline.
In other words, a vehicle can first obtain a list of pseudo-identities and the corresponding
private keys, then no delay will be caused at the vehicle side due to this process.
5.4.2 tRSU Formation
When a traffic accident occurs shown in Fig. 5.2, any vehicle involved in the acci-
dent with a pseudo-identity PIDi = (PIDi1, P ID
i









2) · SKi2 ∈ G1 (5.3)
and then sends out the signed warning message with the following format
Payload Head Payload Signature
PIDi (84 bytes) m (200 bytes) σi (64 bytes)
After receiving the warning message, other vehicles can check its validity by the
following equation,
ê(σi, P ) = ê(PID
i
1, Ppub1) · ê(h(m,PIDi2) ·H(PIDi1, P IDi2), Ppub2) (5.4)
If it holds, the warning message can be convinced. Otherwise, the warning message
will be filtered out. Since




2) · SKi2, P )
=ê(SKi1, P ) · ê(h(m,PIDi2) · SKi2, P )
=ê(s1 · PIDi1, P ) · ê(h(m,PIDi2) · s2 ·H(PIDi1, P IDi2), P )
=ê(PIDi1, Ppub1) · ê(h(m,PIDi2) ·H(PIDi1, P IDi2), Ppub2)
(5.5)
At the beginning, this tRSU is not fully trusted by other approaching vehicles.
However, it is expected that even the tRSU is not fully trusted yet, other drivers will
still approach carefully by responding to the warning. Hence, to enhance the trustiness
of car accident warning message broadcast by an tRSU, some passing-by vehicles will
use their private keys to sign the same warning message m after they witness the
incident. For example, the vehicle with a pseudo-identity PIDj will send the valid
〈PIDj||m||σj〉 to the initiator(s).
After a while, suppose the initiator(s) holds n signed warning messages 〈PID1||m||σ1〉,
· · · , 〈PIDn||m||σn〉, n ≥ 1. We assume that n is an oracle number that is accepted by
every driver, and any set of n drivers are unlikely becoming malicious. Given supports
to one tRSU by the other n drivers, the tRSU will be trusted by all the drivers.
Intuitively, an tRSU can simply broadcast all its possessing signed warning messages
to convince any other approaching vehicle of the authenticity of this tRSU, but it may
impose a large communication overhead on the system if n is large. It is worth noting
that the larger n is, the more secure the proposed system can be. Hence, instead, the










h(m,PIDj2) · SKj2 (5.6)
then sends out the signed warning message with the following format
Payload Head Payload Signature
PID1|| · · · ||PIDn (84 · n bytes) m (200 bytes) σ (64 bytes)
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After receiving the aggregated warning message, any vehicle can check its validity
by the following equation,












where hj = h(m,PIDj2), H




If it holds, the aggregated warning message can be convinced. Otherwise, the

















































Next, a wrong-way warning system is presented. The proposed wrong-way warning
system is composed of the following two phases: the vehicle movement prediction phase
and the wrong-way detection and warning phase. First, an tRSU or a vehicle predicts
the movement of any approaching vehicle and its neighboring vehicles, respectively.
Then, the movement of the vehicle is checked against its current location as well as
road condition. If a possible wrong-way incident is going to happen, a wrong-way
warning will be forwarded to the vehicle to alert the driver.
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Vehicle Movement Prediction phase
In this phase, the tRSU or the vehicle performs the movement prediction to under-
stand the possible moving pattern of an approaching vehicle. The vehicle’s movement
prediction is comprised of two scenarios: along a road scenario and at an intersection
scenario. There are only two directions a vehicle would go in the first scenario, either
frontward or backward. In this scenario, we define a R3 space, where a sample in the
space is a three-dimensional vector which is presented as follows:
〈Direction, Speed, Acceleration〉 (5.9)
where Direction denotes the direction that a vehicle is going in, such as east or west,
Speed denotes the velocity of a driving vehicle, and Acceleration denotes whether a driv-
ing vehicle accelerates or decelerates. If the value of the field Acceleration is positive,
then the vehicle is accelerating. Otherwise, the vehicle is decelerating.
The vectors (X) in the R3 space are regarded as a feature of the vehicle which can
be extracted from an RSU in an offline manner. Then, these vectors as training samples
are input into the multilayer perceptron classifier as represented in Section 5.2. The
back-propagation algorithm is employed to train the weights of our classifier. In this
scenario, the number of neurons in an output layer is equal to two because there are
only two possible outputs, going frontward or backward. To make a decision, the larger
output of the two neurons is treated as a correct result. For instance, the first neuron
denotes going frontward, and the second neuron denotes going backward. If the result
of the output layer is that the first neuron is larger than the second, this means that
the vehicle will go frontward in the near future.
In a VANET, in most cases of the first scenario, a vehicle will go forward unless
some accidents occur. However, when we take the second scenario into account, in
which a vehicle is going through an intersection, the direction prediction of a vehicle
will become much more complicated. Generally speaking, when a vehicle arrives at an
intersection, as shown in Fig. 5.4, there are four directions a vehicle can choose among.
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For example, a vehicle might turn left, turn right, go ahead, or U-turn. Similar to the
first scenario, we define a R5 space, and a sample in the space is a five-dimensional
vector as presented below:
〈Direction, Speed, Acceleration,Turn-Light , Traffic-Light〉 (5.10)
where the first three fields have the same meaning as presented in the first scenario.
The fourth field, Turn-Light, denotes signals of the turn light of a vehicle, particularly
when a vehicle is going to turn at an intersection. As we define it, this field has five
possible values, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1, which denotes the flashing of a left-turn light,
the flashing of a right-turn light, the flashing of a brake light, the flashing of both a
left-turn light and a brake light, and the flashing of both a right-turn light and a brake
light of the vehicle, respectively. The last field, Traffic-Light, indicates the color of the
current traffic light, red, green or yellow.
Figure 5.4: The movement direction prediction at an intersection
Similar to the first scenario, vectors (X) in the R5 space are regarded as training
Secure and Privacy-Preserving Vehicular Communications 86
samples which are also obtained from an RSU. The number of neurons of the output
layers depends on how many possible directions an intersection has, and the value
is equal to four in Fig. 5.4, for example. Each neuron denotes the direction that a
vehicle is going to turn to, and the neuron in the output layer that has the largest
value indicates the predication result. Now, through predicting a vehicles movement
direction, the tRSU or the vehicle has the knowledge of a vehicle’s future movement;
thus, the tRSU and the vehicle is able to find out whether the vehicle is going to enter
a closed road or lane based on its current location.
Wrong-way detection and warning phase
Based on the prediction result in the aforementioned phase, the tRSU or vehicle further
obtains the vehicle’s driving direction, location from the vehicle’s broadcast traffic-
related message, and then checks against the road closure conditions. Next, the tRSU
or vehicle executes the wrong-way check, which is illustrated in the following example
as shown as in Fig. 5.5.
V1 is driving on University street southbound, and V3 and V4 are driving on Uni-
versity street northbound. Also, V2 is driving on King street eastbound. Further, part
of King street is closed due to an accident. An tRSU is installed to inform the drivers
about the road closure. Based on V3’s broadcast traffic-related information, the tRSU
notices that V3 is going to make a right turn and enter an unsafe and closed area. Then,
a wrong-way warning message will be sent to V3 by the tRSU to alert the driver.
5.5 Performance Analysis
5.5.1 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we discuss how the proposed secure VANET-based road traffic con-
trol system prevents several general attacks described in the threat models in Section














Figure 5.5: Wrong-way detection and warning
5.3.2.
Analysis on Conditional Privacy
To analyze the conditional privacy, we need to show that the following two statements
hold: i) no other OBUs and RSUs get to know the real OBU identity from the signed
warning messages, and ii) the MTO has the ability to trace the real OBU.
i) Given a signed warning messages (PIDi,m, σi), each OBU or RSU can verify
its validity with respective to the pseudo-identity PIDi = (PIDi1, P ID
i
2) by Eq. (5.4).
However, based on Eq. (5.1), we know PIDi is actually a secure ElGamal ciphertext.
Without knowing the master-key s1, it is hard to recover the real identity ID from
C1 = rP, C2 = ID · f(rPpub1) mod q. Suppose that there exists an adversary who can
recover ID from (C1, C2) with a non-negligible probability ε. Then, by observation,
we know the adversary must have either guessed the correct hash value of f(rPpub1) or
gained the right value rPpub1 from (rP, s1P ). Because f(rPpub1) is randomly chosen from
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Z∗q, we therefore know the successful guess probability is less than 1/q. In sequence, we
will further know the adversary can resolve the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
problem with another non-negligible probability ε− 1/q. However, this result leads to
the contradiction with the assumption that the CDH problem is hard in G1. Therefore,
we can conclude that no other OBU or RSU can trace the real identity of OBU.
ii) With the master key s1, the MTO can easily compute rPpub1 from C1, and then




Therefore, based on the above analysis, the conditional privacy is achieved in secure
road traffic control system.
Analysis on Bogus Road Control Message Attack
In order to get a better traffic condition, an adversary may launch the bogus road
control message attack. However, since the conditional privacy is ensured, if the bogus
road control message takes effects, the real identity of the adversary will be tracked by
the MTO such that those abusers can be prosecuted later. Therefore, the conditional
privacy actually provides the preventive strategy on this attack.
Analysis on Sybil Attack
In a sybil attack, an adversary generates a large number of pseudonymous entities to
help a fake RSU to evolve into a trusted mobile RSU. On one hand, if the signatures
signed on these pseudonymous entities cannot pass the verification, they will be filtered
out and make no sense. On the other hand, if these signatures are valid, then the
MTO could track the real identity of the adversary because of the conditional privacy
preservation. Therefore, the sybil attack can also be prevented.
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Analysis on Aggregated Warning Message
Eq. (5.8) has shown that if all signatures σ1, σ2, · · · , σn are valid, then the aggregated
signature σ =
∑n
j=1 σj is also valid. Now, to analyze the aggregated warning message,
we should also show that given n− 1 valid signatures σ2, · · · , σn, it is impossible for an
adversary to forge an aggregated signature σ which aggregates n signatures. Suppose
that an adversary can forge an aggregated signature σ satisfying Eq. (5.7) from n− 1
signatures σ2, · · · , σn. Then, since for j = 2, · · · , n
ê(σj, P ) = ê
(
PIDj1, Ppub1
) · ê (hj ·Hj, Ppub2
)
where hj = h(m,PIDj2), H















) · ê (h1 ·H1, Ppub2
)
where h1 = h(m,PID12), H




which however contradicts with the assumption that Bilinear Pairing Inverse (BPI)
Problem “Given P ∈ G1, ê(Q,P ) ∈ G2, compute Q ∈ G1 ” is hard [73]. Therefore, we
can conclude that the aggregated warning message is secure against the forgery attack.
5.5.2 Efficiency Analysis
We analyze the reduction of bandwidth consumption due to the proposed scheme based
on aggregated signature compared with other schemes based on the regular public key
digital signature and BLS non-identity-based aggregation [58].
The total execute time for verifying a warning message is composed of three aspects
of cryptographic operations, including the time for pairing computation from G1 ×G1
to G2, the time for map-to-point hash operation, and the time for point multiplication
in G1, which is shown in Table 5.1.
The total execute time for verifying the proposed aggregated signature is
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Table 5.1: Time costs of dominant cryptographic operations
Operation Description Time
Tpair Time for one pairing computation from G1 ×G1 to G2 15.73 ms
Tmtp Time for one map-to-point hash operation 0.15 ms
Tpmul Time for one point multiplication in G1 2.34 ms
Tver = 3Tpair + n · (Tmtp + Tpmul)
= 47.19 + n · 2.49 ms
(5.14)
Further, if without aggregation, the total execute time for verifying a warning mes-
sage is
Tver = n · (3Tpair + Tmtp + Tpmul)
= n · 49.68 ms
(5.15)
Also, the total execute time for verifying a warning message with BLS non-identity-
based aggregation is
Tver = (n + 1) · Tpair + n · Tmtp
= 15.73 + n · 15.88 ms
(5.16)
Obviously, the total execute time for verifying a warning message with the pro-
posed scheme is the shortest one among the aforementioned schemes, particularly, as
n becomes larger.
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5.5.3 Accident Reduction Analysis
We consider an abnormal area with n accident scenes. For simplicity, we assume that
it is possible that every vehicle attempts to enter the wrong way with probability of p1
even there is an tRSU on the road, and then try to merge back to the main stream
carelessly with probability of p2, which results in an incident. Further, we denote the
accuracy of the movement prediction as p3. Hence, we have the probability paccident of
having car accident without wrong-way warning
paccident = 1− (1− p1p2)n (5.17)
And, the probability p
′
accident of having car accident with wrong-way warning
p
′
accident = 1− (1− p1p2(1− p3))n (5.18)
In an effort to evaluate the accident reduction under the proposed wrong-way warn-
ing scheme, the accuracy rate of the direction prediction of a vehicle’s movement plays
an important role. Hence, the primary issue is to calculate the accuracy rate of the
direction prediction of a vehicle’s movement. Since the scenario of driving at an inter-
section is much more complicated than the scenario of driving along the road, without
loss of generality, we take the first one as a test environment. Specifically, the physical
location, 398 Westmount Rd. N, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, is taken as our test inter-
section, which is shown in Fig. 5.6 [60]. Eight hundred samples are collected, and each
sample is a five-dimensional vector, where each element of the vector is the same as
presented before. In our data set, Direction is towards the west, and Speed records the
instant velocity of a vehicle. In addition, the Addition field provides the information
about traffic light, red, yellow, green, and left-arrow green. Since it is forbidden for
a vehicle to U-turn at that intersection, the desired output of a vehicle’s movement is
turning left, turning right, and going ahead.
A three-layer perceptron is employed, and the number of neurons of the input layer
is equal to five, where each presents a feature. The number of neurons of the hidden
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Figure 5.6: The intersection of the data collection
layer is equal to ten, and the number of neurons of the output layer is equal to three,
where the biggest associated output on the neuron denotes the responding decision.
The data set is divided into two parts, a training set with 600 samples and a testing
set with 200 samples.
Table 5.2: The performance of movement prediction
Turn left Turn right Go ahead Total
Total number 71 65 64 200
Accurate number 68 64 64 196
Accurate rate 95.7 98.4 100 98.0
Table 5.2 presents the accuracy of the prediction. There are a total of 200 samples
for testing. 71 out of 200 vehicles turned left at the intersection, and 68 samples
are classified correctly; 65 out of 200 vehicles turned right at the intersection, and
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64 samples are classified correctly; 64 out of 200 vehicles went straight ahead at the
intersection, and 64 is classified correctly. Thus the total accuracy rate is 98.0%. The
key reason why the wrong prediction occurs is traffic violations. For example, some
vehicles do not show their left-turn (right-turn) light when they turn left (right), or
even indicate the wrong turn light.


































Figure 5.7: Accident reduction due to wrong-way warning
Fig. 5.7 shows the probability of accident occurrence with respect to the number
of road closures in an abnormal area under both situations where or not wrong-way
warning system exists. It can be seen that a car accident may likely happen when a
wrong-way warning system does not exist. Further, the probability of accident occur-
rence in an abnormal area increases with the increase of road closures, but more serious
in the case where a wrong-way warning system is not present. It is also observed that
the accuracy of the prediction has big impact on the probability of accident occurrence
as well, which is shown in Fig. 5.8. The more accurate the movement prediction is, the
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safer an abnormal area can be.





























The accuracy rate = 0.95
The accuracy rate = 0.85
The accuracy rate = 0.75
Figure 5.8: Accident reduction with different accuracy of movement prediction
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel secure road traffic control system based on
VANETs along with a suite of strategies for mitigating the vicious effects due to the
malicious attackers. To achieve the proposed application scenario, a new implementa-
tion of temporary RSU, termed tRSU, was introduced, which is automatically formed
by those vehicles involved in an abnormal situation, such as a car accident, in order
to serve as temporary RSU that can improve the safety at the scene of the accident.
In addition, the proposed system can achieve an intelligent transportation flow control
by helping vehicles to circumvent the areas with abnormal situations while ensuring
the security and privacy of the users from various threats. Analysis results showed
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that the proposed system can improve the road safety in an abnormal situation signifi-
cantly when road authority is absent at the scene, which can be considered as the most





Road system is the most important factor in determining economic performance. In
recent years, in order to promote and sustain continued economic growth, we have
witnessed dramatic road infrastructure development all over the world. It not only
promotes a sustainable and continued economic growth but also provides the drivers
with values in terms of time savings, convenience, better-maintained roads and traveler
services. However, road construction, maintenance and operation are very expensive.
Nowadays, many public roadways are seriously underfunded and badly maintained,
which will also adversely affect economy. This results that government not only in-
creases the tax to cover the shortage of the funding, but also starts transferring the
development, operation and maintenance of roads to the private sector, which results
toll road, also known as pay-as-you-go toll road. It introduces the whole economic with
toll road. One of the main challenges facing toll road is toll collection. At present,
there are mainly two types of toll collection methods. The first one is manual toll
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collection, where the driver has to stop at a toll booth and pays the toll fee in cash
or with credit card. This would cause the delay on toll roads. Obviously, the delay
incurred in toll collection becomes very annoying to drivers, which obviously violates
the original premise for improving both customer satisfaction and efficiency of traffic
flow. Thus, a lot of toll roads began electronic tolling-only, i.e., Electronic Toll Collec-
tion (ETC). ETC takes advantage of wireless communication technologies to perform
an electronic monetary transaction between the cars passing through a toll station and
the toll agency. It determines whether the cars passing are enrolled in the program,
and alerts enforcers for those that are not. It debits electronically the accounts of
registered cars without their stopping, or even opening a window. When a registered
vehicle passes through the toll booths, its tag, also known as transponder, is auto-
matically detected and the appropriate fee is deducted from the driver’s account. The
transponder is a small electronic device fitted on the inside of the vehicle windscreen
which is read either by roadside sensors located in entry and exit lanes. Vehicle without
the transponder, will be taken image of its license plate, and recognized through license
plate recognition (LPR) system. Then, the charges will be applied to the owner of that
license registered with the authority, such as Ministry of Transportation (MTO). Then
tolls are calculated based on the factors like time of the day, vehicle class, distance
traveled, etc. afterwards, a bill is mailed to customer for usage.
Despite the pluses of currently existing ETC technology, it has some downfalls and
suffers from some drawbacks concerning cost, fraud, and privacy, which are shown as
follows:
• Firstly, besides toll road usage, drivers have to pay either monthly transponder
lease fees or video toll charges. In reality, the toll charges are one-third more for
drivers who do not have a transponder to offset the costs caused by video toll
charges. It is highly like that a toll road operator tries to minimize transponder
lease fees in order to encourage drivers to choose the toll road. However, there
Secure and Privacy-Preserving Vehicular Communications 98
could be many toll road operators in an area or country. It is impractical and
inconvenient for a driver to register with several toll road operators and mount
more than one transponders in his/her car. High cost prevents drivers from
choosing toll road, and then flashes the red light to the construction of toll road.
• Secondly, it is vulnerable to fraud by drivers. In reality, it is very easy for a
malicious driver to counterfeit his license plate to avoid tolls, such as fake license
plate. Further, it is also subject to some advanced threats, such as by of way of
using a license plate cover that can prevent high angle mounted toll road cameras
from getting a clear shot of a license plate, which results in the failure of license
plate recognition (LPR) system. However, it is usually too late when toll road
operators discover fraud.
• Thirdly, there is an increasing demand on driver privacy and anonymity. The
driver’s personal information and his driving history need to be well protected.
Thus, having a secure and effective toll fare collection system is more than critical
to its overall success of a toll road system. In this chapter, we aim to introduce a novel
efficient and secure payment system for road toll collection based on VANETs. By
designing a tollgate specifically for electronic toll collection, it is possible to carry out
open-road tolling, where the driver does not need to slow at all when passing through
the tollgate. Further, the driver privacy and anonymity are protected, and traceability
is provided where a particular transaction can be traced back to a driver only when
it is necessary. For example, the authorities should be able to reveal the identity of a
driver involved in a particular transaction in the case of a traffic event dispute such as
a crime/car accident scene investigation, which can be used to look for witnesses. For
example, by using entry and exit a driver used and date, the authorities can figure who
has possibly passed a crime/car accident scene.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, preliminaries
Chapter 6. Secure VANET-based Toll Collection System 99
are presented. In Section 6.3, a secure VANET-based toll collection system is intro-
duced. Section 6.4 discusses the security of the proposed system. Finally, we summarize
this chapter in Section 6.5.
6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
The elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) were first introduced by Miller [63] and Koblitz
[17]. Since then, many researcher have examined elliptic curves cryptosystems due
to their high bit security. The elliptic curve cryptosystems which are based on the
elliptic curve logarithm over the finite field have many advantages over other convenient
cryptosystems [35, 36]. First, the key size in ECCs can be much smaller over the
other cryptosystems. Second, even if the factoring and multiplicative group discrete
logarithm are broken, the elliptic curve discrete logarithms might be still intractable.
Therefore, we will design our system based on the elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Let p be a large prime. In the finite field Zp, an elliptic curve is represented as
E : y2 = x3 + ax + b (6.1)
where a, b ∈ Zp and 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 mod p. The elliptic curve indicates the integer
points set that contains all points over the elliptic curve and a point of infinity O.
The point of infinity O is the third points of intersection of any straight line with the
curve, so that there are points including (x, y), (x,−y), and O on the straight line. The
necessity of 4a3 +27b2 6= 0 mod p is to guarantee that the curve y2 = x3 +ax+ b mod p
will not cause repeated factors. The set Ep(a, b) defines a finite Abelian group, then the
calculation in the finite Abelian group can be precisely executed because the occurrence
of round off error in cryptographic application is disallowed.
The set of elliptic curve points forms a commutative finite group under the rules
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of addition operation, the infinity O serves as the additive identity, and the following
relations hold for all P,Q, R ∈ Ep(a, b):
1. P +O = O+ P = P (existence of an identity element)
2. P + Q = Q + P (commutativity)
3. (P + Q) + R = P + (Q + R) (associativity)
4. there exists (−P ) such that −P + P = P + (−P ) = O (existence of inverses)
For any two points P = (xP , yP ) and Q = (xQ, yQ) over Ep(a, b), the elliptic curve





2 − xP − xQ











if P = Q
(6.3)
We refer to [17, 63] for a more comprehensive description of how ECCs work.
6.2.2 Blind Signature
The concept of blind signature was first introduced by Chaum [74, 75]. Different
from the normal digital signature schemes, in a blind signature scheme, a signer signs a
message without knowing what the message contains. That is, the message is blinded by
a requester. After receiving the signed message from the signer, the requester can derive
the valid signature of the message from the signer. Anyone can verify the blind signature
using the public key of the signer. If the message and its signature are published, the
signer can verify the signature, but he/she cannot link the message-signature pair. Due
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to these two properties: blindness and untraceability, blind signatures are widely used
used to realize a lot of cryptographic protocols such as secure voting protocol and
electronic payment systems
6.2.3 Micro-Payment
A micro-payment scheme is an electronic payment system designed to allow efficient
frequent payments of small amounts (e.g., less than one dollar or a few cents). In order
to be efficient and keep the transaction cost very low, micro-payments minimize the
communication and computation used. In contrast to macro-payment, micro- payment
schemes aim to allow offline payment verification using lightweight cryptosystems. The
systems do not require high transaction security, in order to increase efficiency. The
cost of fraud is made more expensive than the possible value to be gained by cheating.
A micro-payment system is generally composed of three entities, i.e., customer,
vender, and broker. Customers open an account with a broker. The broker issues
a digitally signed certificate, which authorizes the customer to make PayWord chain
and assures vendors that the customer’s PayWords are redeemable. The PayWords
employs the cryptographic properties of digital signature and hash chain. Customer
creates the PayWord chain w1, w2, · · · , wn in reverse order by picking the last Payword
wn at random, and then computing wi−1 = h(wi), where h is a collision-resistant hash
function, and i = 1, · · · , n. Here w0 is the root of the PayWord chain, and is not a
PayWord itself. The commitment of the PayWord chain contains the root w0, but not
any PayWord wi, where i ≥ 1. The i-th payment (for i = 1, 2, · · · ) from the client
to the vendor consists of the pair (wi, i), which the vender can verify by checking the
commitment and w0 = h
i(wi).
We refer to [76] for a more comprehensive description of Micro-Payment.
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6.2.4 Security Requirements
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of an e-Toll payment system. In order to
solve the above mentioned issues, an e-Toll system has to meet the following require-
ments:
• Correctness: If an honest driver runs e-Toll purchase protocol with the bank and
runs any of the Toll payment protocol with the RSUs, the RSUs will accept the
e-Toll.
• Unforgeability: E-Toll is unforgeable. Only the bank can issue the valid e-Toll,
anyone else can’t.
• Separability: The separability would be feasible and perhaps desirable in the case
of e-Toll. An e-Toll can be divided into several mini-E-Tolls, and the total amount
of these mini-E-Tolls equals to the original E-Toll.
• Double-spent proof: An e-Toll is not allowed to be double-spent. Once the double-
spent occurs, it can be detected.
• Conditional anonymity: In the normal cases, the e-Toll spending doesn’t leak the
driver’s identity, and the driver is kept anonymity. However, if the driver double-
spent the e-Toll, then with the help of trusted third party, the driver’s identity
can be revealed.
6.3 Secure VANET-based Toll Collection System
In this section, we introduce a novel secure VANET-based toll collection system. For
ease of reference, we first list the notations used throughout the description of the
proposed system as follows:
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Notations Descriptions
B Bank who issues the e-toll
D Driver who purchases the e-toll and participate in the toll
payment protocol
T1, T2 Trusted third party, T1 the register manager, T2 the transac-
tion manager
P1, P2, · · · , Pnp np toll road operators
RSUij, 1 ≤ j ≤ nr nr RSUs of the ith toll road operator Pi
6.3.1 System Architecture and Setup
For the considered system architecture, there are four types of network entities: the
drivers, the trusted third parties (TTPs), the Bank, and the toll road operators, while
their relationship is shown in Fig. 6.1. The Bank has a mutual agreement with each
toll road operator such that a bank-issued e-Toll can be used to pay the toll when a
driver drives the toll roads operated by those operators. A driver has to purchase e-Toll
from the Bank in order to travel the toll roads run by an operator, or may otherwise
be charged the cost for license plate recognition or toll-road violation processing. At
entries and exits of the toll roads, which are toll collection points in the proposed system,
e-Tolls are collected and then accumulated into a batch and settled automatically at
regular time intervals, e.g., at the end of each day, with the Bank. This settlement
can be viewed as a transaction between the Bank and the toll road operators. When
a batch is submitted, the Bank transfers the corresponding amounts to the operator’s
bank account. Similar to credit card transaction processing, by dealing with a batch of
clearance requests at a time, the Bank can be relieved from involving every transaction.
Let p be a large prime, (eg. p > 3). Randomly choose two field elements a, b ∈ Fp































Figure 6.1: VANET-based toll collection system architecture
and define the elliptic curve equation
E : y2 = x3 + ax + b (mod p)
over Fp, where 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (mod p). The cardinality of E should be divisible by a
large prime number with regard to the security issue raised by Pohlig and Hellman [68].
Let P = (xP , yP ) be a generator point over E(Fp) whose order is a large prime
number q, where P 6= O, and O denotes the point at infinity. In the end, the system
parameters {E(Fp), P, q} are made public. The system parameters, in addition, also
include four cryptographic hash functions: H0, H1, H2 and H, where Hi : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q,
for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and H : {0, 1}∗ → E(Fp) [45].
The Bank B chooses a random number xB ∈ Z∗q as his private key, and computes
the corresponding public key YB ∈ E(Fp), where YB = xBP . A driver D can purchase
e-Toll from the Bank B.
There are two trusted third parties T1, T2 in the proposed system. One of the TTPs,
for example T1, is the register manager, and the other one, T2, can be the transaction
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manager. A specific e-Toll can be traced to a specific e-Toll purchase transaction only
with approval and involvement of two TTPs, which results in the discovery of the real
identity of the driver. Each trusted third party Ti, i ∈ {1, 2}, chooses a random number
xTi ∈ Z∗q as his private key, and computes his individual public keys YTi ∈ E(Fp), where
YTi = xTiP .
Without loss of generality, suppose that there are total np toll road operators
P1, · · · Pnp in the system. Each operator Pi, for i = 1, · · · , np chooses a random num-
ber xi ∈ Z∗q as his private key, and computes the corresponding public key Yi ∈ E(Fp),
where Yi = xiP . Further, we assume that each toll road operator Pi, for i = 1, · · · , np
administrates nr RSUs (denoted as RSUij, where 1 ≤ j ≤ nr) to toll. Then, for each
RSU RSUij, the toll road manager Pi generates RSUij’s location-aware key pair as
follows.
• RSUij first chooses a random number xij ∈ Z∗q, computes RLij = xijP , and sends
(Lij, RLij) to the toll road operator Pi, where Lij is the location of the RSU
RSUij.
• Upon receiving (Lij, RLij), Pi chooses a random number rij ∈ Z∗q, computes
Rij = rijP , dij = rij + xi · H0(Lij||RLij ||Rij) mod q. In the end, Pi sends the
location-aware key LSKij = (Rij, dij) to RSUij.
• RSUij checks its validity by dijP ?= Rij + H0(Lij||RLij ||Rij)Yi. Then, RSUij
computes the private key sij = xij + dij mod q such that sijP = RLij + Rij +
H0(Lij||RLij ||Rij)Yi.
6.3.2 E-Toll Purchase Protocol
When a driver D wants to purchase e-Toll, the following steps will be executed, which
is shown in Fig. 6.2.

















Figure 6.2: E-Toll purchase
Step 1. The driver D randomly chooses a random numbers r ∈ Z∗q, and computes
C, R ∈ E(Fp) 


C = ID + r · YT1,
R = rP
(6.4)
where ID ∈ E(Fp) is the driver’s legal identity. The driver D then submits (C, R) to
the register manager T1.
Step 2. After receiving (C, R), the register manager T1 first uses his private key xT1
to recover the driver’s identity as
ID = C − xT1 ·R (6.5)
then authenticates the validity of ID. If ID is invalid, T1 refuses the driver’s request.
Otherwise, T1 chooses a unique randomized identity RID, stores (ID, RID) into his
local database, and forwards (RID,R) to the transaction manager T2.
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Step 3. When the transaction manager T2 receives (RID,R), he chooses two random




R1 = αP, R2 = βR = βrP
c = H0(R1, R),
z = α− c · xT2 mod q
(6.6)
T2 then sends (R2, c, z) back to the driver D, and stores (RID, βP, c) into his local
database. Here, c in an unique identifer of this protocol instance such that
H0(R3, R) = c, where R3 = zP + cYT2 (6.7)
The correction is as follows,
H0(R3, R)
= H0(zP + cYT2, R)
= H0((α− c · xT2)P + cYT2, R)
= H0 (αP − c · xT2P + cYT2, R)
= H0 (αP, R) = H0 (R1, R) = c
(6.8)
Step 4. When the driver D receives (R2, c, z), he uses r to recover βP as follows,
r−1R2 = r−1βrP = βP (6.9)
In such a way, only the driver D knows the secret information βP with the transaction
manager T2.
Assume the value for toll unit is v$ and the driver D wants to purchase the e-Toll
100$. He first generates a hash chain h0, h1, · · · , hn initiated from a random s, where
hn = s, hi−1 = h(hi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and n = 100v .
The driver notifies the bank B and submits the message (R, c, z) and payment 100$
to the bank B.
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Step 5. When the bank B receives (R, c, z) and 100$, he first uses the trusted third
party T2’s public key YT2 to verify the validity of (R, c, z) by checking
H0(zP + cYT2, R) = c
If it is not valid, the bank B refuses this request. Otherwise, he chooses a random
number k ∈ Z∗q, computes and returns
K = kP ∈ E(Fp) (6.10)
to the driver D.
Step 6. When the driver D receives K, he first computes c0, c1, c2, where
ci = Hi(βP ), where i = 0, 1, 2 (6.11)
and ch = h0 · H0(c1, c2) mod q, M = H(100$, h0, c0) ∈ E(Fp). Then, he computes σ1
and m′, where 


σ1 = M + c1P + c2K ∈ E(Fp)
m′ = c−12 ·H0(σ1) (mod q)
(6.12)
The driver D also chooses a random number u ∈ Z∗q, and computes U , θ, where


U = uP ∈ E(Fp)
θ = u− rH0(R,U,m′) (mod q)
(6.13)
In the end, D sends (ch,m′, U, θ) to the bank B.
Step 7. Upon receiving (ch,m′, U, θ), the bank B can use R = rP that is authenti-
cated in Step 5 to verify the validity of (m′, U, θ) by the following equation,
θP = U −H0(R,U,m′)R (6.14)
The correction is as follows,
θP
= (u− rH0(R,U,m′))P
= uP − rH0(R,U,m′)P
= U −H0(R,U,m′)R
(6.15)
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Once (m′, U, θ) is valid, the bank B sends (c, ch, K, 100$) to the trusted third party T2.
Step 8. After receiving (c, ch, K, 100$), the trusted third party (transaction man-
ager) T2 retrieves the stored (RID, βP, c) through the identifier c, and computes ci =




h0 = ch/H0(c1, c2) mod q
M = H(100$, h0, c0) ∈ E(Fp)
σ1 = M + c1P + c2K ∈ E(Fp)
m∗ = c−12 ·H0(σ1) (mod q)
(6.16)
In the end, m∗ is returned back to the bank B, and T2 updates (RID, h0, c, c0, 100$)
in his database.
Step 9. After the bank B receives m∗, he checks whether m′ = m∗ or not. If yes, the
bank B can believe that the driver D honestly purchases the e-Toll 100$, and therefore
computes
σ′2 = m
′ · xB + k (mod q) (6.17)
and sends σ′2 back to the driver D. Otherwise, the bank B thinks that the driver D is
dishonest and terminates transaction.
Step 10. After receiving σ′2, the driver D computes
σ2 = σ
′
2 · c2 + c1 (mod q) (6.18)
and checks if
−σ2P + H0(σ1)YB + σ1
= −(m′xBc2 + kc2 + c1)P + H0(σ1)YB + σ1
= −m′xBc2P − kc2P − c1P + H0(σ1)YB + σ1
= −m′c2YB − c2K − c1P + H0(σ1)YB + σ1
= −H0(σ1)YB − c2K − c1P + H0(σ1)YB + M + c1P + c2K
= M
(6.19)
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If it is valid, the blind signature on e-Toll 100$ is (σ1, σ2, c0). Then, anyone can
check its validity by the following equation
−σ2P + H0(σ1)YB + σ1 = H(100$, h0, c0) (6.20)
In such a way, the driver D finishes purchasing e-Toll (100$, σ1, σ2, c0) as well as a
secret payment chain (h0, · · · , hn).
6.3.3 Toll Payment Protocol
In this subsection, toll payment protocol is described. The payment is carried out
in two stages. First as a driver enters the toll road, the driver is recorded the entry
automatically by RSU issuing an e-Ticket to the driver, where RSU is operated by the
toll road operator and located along entry lanes. In the second one, the driver takes an
exit and leaves the toll road. Then the driver submits the e-Ticket to the RSU, which
is located along exit lanes. The RSU then calculates the toll based on some factors,
such as, distance traveled, data in the car-identification chips including vehicle weight
and class, and prompts the driver to pay the right amount of toll. Finally, the driver
pays the toll by submitting the appropriate amount of e-Toll, and the RSU issues a
signed e-Receipt to the driver.
There are three entities involved in this protocol: the driver, RSU located at toll
road entry location, namely entrance RSU, and RSU located at toll road exit location,
namely payment RSU. The proposed e-Toll payment protocol are shown in Fig. 6.3,
and the basic steps of the protocol are further described in the following paragraphs.
E-Ticket issuing protocol. We first introduce E-Ticket issuing protocol when a
driver enters the toll road from the entry where entrance RSU RSUij is located, shown
in Fig. 6.4.
Step 1. When a driver drives a car and is entering a toll road, the driver sends
an e-Ticket request message to the entrance RSU RSUij, which contains a random
number n, the location of the vehicle LD, and a timestamp T .








2E-Ticket issuing E-Toll payment and e-Receipt issuing
Figure 6.3: E-Toll payment
Step 2. After receiving the e-Ticket request, the entrance RSU RSUij under
the location Lij chooses a random number r ∈ Z∗q, computes R = rP and β =
H0(Lij||RLij||Rij||R||m), where m = n||T ||Lij. Then, the RSUij sets the signature
(RLij, Rij, R, σ), where σ = r + sijβ mod q. Then, the RSUij sends (RLij, Rij, R, σ) to
the driver D as well as Lij.
Step 3. The driverD, upon receipt of (RLij, Rij, R, σ, Lij), then verifies the signature




= R + β(RLij + Rij + H0(Lij||RLij||Rij)Yi) (6.21)
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Driver D Entrance RSU RSUij
n,LD,T−−−−−−−−−−−→
r
R←− Z∗q , m = n||T ||Lij
R = rP , β = H0(Lij||RLij ||R||m)
σ = r + sijβ mod q
σ,RLij ,Rij ,R,β,Lij←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check whether Lij reflects the entry the
driver is taking by checking LD − Lij
m = n||T ||Lij
σP
?
= R + β(RLij + Rij + H0(Lij||RLij||Rij)Yi)
If holds, accept it. E-Ticket
Otherwise drop it.
Figure 6.4: E-Ticket issuing protocol
If it holds, the e-Ticket (RLij, Rij, R, σ) can be accepted, otherwise rejected, since
R + β(RLij + Rij + H0(Lij||RLij||Rij)Yi)
= rP + β(xijP + rijP + H0(Lij||RLij||Rij)xiP )
= rP + β(xij + rij + H0(Lij||RLij||Rij)xi)P
= rP + β(xij + dij)P
= rP + βsijP = σP
(6.22)
E-Toll payment protocol. We next introduce E-toll payment protocol when the
driver leaves the toll road from the road exit location where payment RSU RSUij′ is
located, shown Fig. 6.5.
Step 1. The driver first submits the e-Ticket to the RSU located along exit lanes.
Step 2. After receiving the e-Ticket, the payment RSU checks the e-Ticket and
calculates the toll based on some factors, such as, distance traveled, data in the car-
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Driver D Payment RSU RSUij′
e-Ticket−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
check e-Ticket
compute the right amount of toll










Figure 6.5: E-Toll payment protocol
identification chips including vehicle weight and class, prompts the driver to pay the
right amount of toll.
Step 3. The driver pays the toll by submitting the appropriate amount of e-Toll by
commitment (σ1, σ2, c0, h0) and PayWords.
Step 4. The payment RSU issues a signed e-Receipt on e-Toll to the driver.
Note. To securely issue the e-Receipt, we employ the certificateless signature tech-
nique as that in e-Ticket issuing protocol. Certificateless signature technique is in-
tended to solve the key escrow problem which is inherent in identity-based cryptog-
raphy, while at the same time, eliminate the use of certificates as in the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), which is generally considered to be costly to use and manage.
Therefore, the toll road operator doesn’t need to assign each subordinated RSU a pub-
lic key and its certificate, and the verifier also doesn’t need to explicitly authenticate the
RSU’s public key firstly, but directly authenticate the validity of the signature (e-Ticket
and e-Receipt) with respect to the operator’s public key and the RSU’s location.
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6.3.4 Traceability Protocol for Double Spending
An e-toll is not allowed to be double-spent. Once the bank B found one e-Toll is
double-spent, he can ask the trusted third party T1 and T2 to track the driver’s real
identity by Algorithm 3.
Data: A disputed e-Toll (σ1, σ2, c0) on 100$
Result: Driver’s real identity ID of this disputed e-Toll
begin1
. Transaction Manager T2: retrieve (RID, h1, c, c0, 100$) in his local database2
with search identifier c0, send the resulted RID to T1.






In this section, we examine the correctness and security of our proposed protocol, eg.
unforgeability and unlinkability. We also show how to cope with the possible abuse of
the unlinkability property under the assistance of the trusted third party.
6.4.1 Correctness
To ensure the correctness, we should first prevent the driver D from deviating from the
right protocol to elude traceability of the trusted third party. In our protocol, to request
a valid blind signature of the bank B on an e-Toll M on 100$, the driver D should not
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only submit the blinded message m′ to the bank, but also send 100$ to the transaction
manager T2 by the bank B’s forwarding. The transaction manager T2 himself computes
the blinded message m∗ according to the previous registration information and then
send m∗ to the bank. By comparing the blinded messages m′ and m∗, the bank B can
judge whether the driver D is honest or not, although he doesn’t know the real identity
of the driver D.
The second correctness we should consider is to prevent the bank B from sending
an invalid signature to the driver D. Therefore, when the driver D receives σ′2 from the
bank B, he should first compute σ2 = σ′2 · c2 + c1 (mod q), and use the bank’s public
key YB to check the correction by equation
−σ2P + H0(σ1)YB + σ1 = M (6.23)
Thus, according to the above two aspects, the correctness of our proposed protocol
is ensured.
6.4.2 Unforgeability
The unforgeability of the proposed system is based on the difficulty of solving the
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) “Given (P, aP ), to compute such
an a ∈ Z∗q”. In the following, the security of all signatures involved in our proposed
system are analyzed.
The trusted third party T2’s signature (c, z) on r1P is unforgeable
In the random oracle model [59], we can prove the signature (c, z) is secure against
existential forgery under an adaptively chosen message attack. Suppose that there is
a polynomial time adversary A which takes R = rP and YT2 as input, and outputs
an existential forgery of a signature from the trusted third party with a non-negligible
probability. Then, by the forking lemma [69], A may get two forgeries of signature
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from the trusted third party T2 for the same R within a polynomial time. Let the two




c = H0(R1, R), c
′ = H ′0(R1, R)
z = α− c · xT2 (mod q)
z′ = α− c′ · xT2 (mod q)
(6.24)
Since c 6= c′, it follows that
z − z′ = c′xT2 − cxT2 (mod q) (6.25)
and we will have
xT2 =
z − z′
c′ − c (mod q) (6.26)
The above equation means we can get xT2 from YT = xT2P . But it will contradict
with the ECDLP assumption. Therefore, the trusted third party T2’s signature (c, z)
on R = rP is unforgeable.
The driver’s signature (U, θ) on m′ is unforgeable
Since R = rP has been signed by the trusted third party T2, R = rP can be regarded
as the driver’s temporary public key delegated by the trusted third party T2. Thus,
in the random oracle model, the driver’s signature (U, θ) on m′ with respect to the
public key R = rP is also secure against existential forgery under an adaptively chosen
message attack.
We still suppose that there is a polynomial time adversary A which takes m′ and
R = rP as input, and outputs an existential forgery of a signature from the driver with
a non-negligible probability. Then, by the forking lemma, A may get two forgeries
of signature from the driver for the same m′ within a polynomial time. Let the two
signature forgeries for m′ be (U = uP, θ) and (U = uP, θ′), where




θ = u− rH0(R,U,m′) (mod q)
θ′ = u− rH ′0(R,U,m′) (mod q)
(6.27)
Since H0(R,U,m
′) 6= H ′0(R,U,m′), it follows that
θ − θ′ = r(H ′0(R,U,m′)−H0(R,U,m′)) (mod q) (6.28)





It also means we can get r from R = rP . But it will contradict with the ECDLP
assumption. Therefore, the driver’s signature (U, θ) on m′ is unforgeable.
The bank’s blind signature (σ1, σ2, c0) on M is unforgeable
Clearly, the signature (σ1, σ2, c0) on M is the Nyberg-Rueppel signature [67]. Assume
that an adversary A wants to forge a signature on a valid message M = H(100$, h1, c0),
he can first chooses σ1, then according to the relation
−σ2P + H2(σ1)YB + σ1 = M (6.30)
he should compute σ2 ∈ Z∗q. However, it is infeasible for him to compute σ2 due to
the hardness of ECDLP problem. With the similar reason, A also can’t compute σ1,
if σ2 is first chosen. Therefore, based on these two points, the bank’s blind signature
(σ1, σ2, c0) on M is unforgeable.
The RSU’s e-Ticket is unforgeable
The RSU’s e-Ticket is of form (RLij, Rij, R, σ), it is also provably secure against the
adaptively chosen message attacks in the random oracle model. Suppose that there is
a polynomial time adversary A can existentially forge the signature (e-Ticket). Then,
by the forking lemma, A can get two forgeries for the same m within a polynomial
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time in the random oracle model. Let the two signature (e-Ticket) forgeries for m be






β′ = H ′0(Lij||RLij||Rij||R||m)
σ = r + sijβ (mod q)
σ′ = r + sijβ′ (mod q)
(6.31)
Since β 6= β′, it follows that
σ − σ′ = sijβ − sijβ′ (mod q) (6.32)
and we will have
sij =
σ − σ
β − β′ (mod q) (6.33)
The above equation shows we can get sij such that
sijP = (RLij + Rij + H0(Lij||RLij||Rij)Yi) (6.34)
But it will contradict with the ECDLP assumption. We note that although the toll
road operator Pi knows dij, he still can’t know sij, since sij = xij + dij mod q includes
the RSU’s partial private key xij. Therefore, based on these analysis, the e-Ticket is
valid and unforgeable.
The RSU’s e-Receipt is unforgeable
Since the RSU’s e-Receipt adopts the same signature used in e-Ticket, we can conclude
that the e-Receipt is also unforgeable.
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6.4.3 Unlinkability
In Step 6, since (c1, c2) are two random numbers in Z∗q, σ1 = M + c1P + c2K is then a
random element in E(Fp). In sequence,
m′ = c−12 ·H0(σ1) = c−12 ·H0(M + c1P + c2K) (6.35)
is also a random number in Z∗q. Therefore, although the bank B receives the blinded
message m′, the m′ will not leak any information about the real message M .
Given a valid signature (σ1, σ2, c0) and any view (m
′, K) of the bank, there always
exists a unique pair blinding factors (c1, c2) such that
m′ = c−12 ·H2(−σ2P + H2(σ1)YB + σ1 + c1P + c2K) (6.36)
Therefore, due to the randomness of the blinding factors (c1, c2), the bank cannot
link a signature (σ1, σ2, c0) to the corresponding instance of signature issuing protocol.
Therefore, our proposed protocol satisfies the unlinkability.
6.4.4 Traceability with the Aid of Trusted Third Party
In our proposed protocol, to cope with the possible abuse of the unlinkability property,
the trusted third party T1 and T2 will have enough information to trace the real identity
ID from the abuse signature (σ1, σ2, c0), because they have stored the entry (ID, RID),
(RID, c, c0, 100$) in their respective database, and can cooperatively trace the real
identity ID by running Algorithm 3. Therefore, with the aid of the trusted third party,
the traceability property holds.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel secure VANET-based toll collection system,
which facilitates quick and reliable toll payment when a driver uses toll road. It not
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only solves existing issues in the current toll collection systems, but also protects toll
road users’ privacy while ensuring the security of toll payment.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, the contributions of this dissertation are concluded, followed by the
future work.
7.1 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis are mainly in two folds: Firstly, a Secure and
Efficient RSU-aided Privacy Preservation Protocol is introduced, which can achieve effi-
cient secure and privacy-preserving Inter-Vehicle Communications (IVC). With the key
chain commitments distributed by RSUs, a vehicle can effectively authenticate any re-
ceived message from vehicles nearby even in the presence of frequent group membership
fluctuation. Compared with previously reported public key infrastructure (PKI)-based
packet authentication protocols for security and privacy [19, 21], the communication
overhead and computation cost of the proposed protocol are significantly reduced due
to the adoption of a short message authentication code (MAC) tag attached in each
packet for the packet source authentication and packet integrity check. Extensive per-
formance evaluation demonstrates that the proposed protocol maintains acceptable
packet latency with much less packet overhead, while significantly reducing the packet
121
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loss ratio compared with that of the existing PKI-based protocols. Such advantages
are particularly important and effective when the road traffic is heavy. Further, a com-
plementary Efficient and Cooperative Message Validation Protocol, called ECMVP, is
developed to deal with the situations where RSUs do not exist.
Secondly, two vehicle applications are proposed. The first one is a vehicle safety
application, namely secure road traffic control system in VANET, to deal with the
situations where instantaneous, temporary, and ad hoc traffic management efforts are
required. This is to assist road traffic control by directing vehicular and pedestrian
traffic around an accident scene or other road disruption areas. The thesis provides
solutions on how to rapidly and accurately disseminate road conditions information
to the public through the state-of-the-art VANET technologies, particularly by way
of collaborative efforts among those drivers within the affected geographic area. The
proposed VANET-based road traffic control system can help move vehicles safely and
securely through the areas subject to abnormal situations while ensuring security and
privacy of the users from various threats. The second one is a vehicle non-safety appli-
cation, namely secure VANET-based toll collection system, to effectively and securely
collect toll when drivers use toll roads.
7.2 Future Work
As for future research plans, the highest priority is to push the developed framework and
schemes into industrious practice. To achieve this, we will work closely with automobile
industry and apply findings from my research to building vehicle safety and non-safety
applications in real world situations. Furthermore, the following research topics will be
investigated as a continuation of my Ph.D. thesis work.
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7.2.1 Secure and Efficient Certificate Revocation
In the traditional PKI architecture, the most commonly adopted certificate revocation
scheme is through CRL, which is a list of revoked certificates stored in central reposi-
tories prepared in CAs. Based on such centralized architecture, alternative solutions to
CRL could be by way of Certificate Revocation System (CRS), Certificate Revocation
Tree (CRT), and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [18], etc. The common
requirement for these schemes is the high availability of the centralized CAs, where
frequent data transmission with the OBUs for obtaining timely revocation information
may cause significant overhead. Thus, with the high-speed mobility and extremely
large amount of network entities in VANETs, the centralized CRL architecture may be
far from realistic.
To tackle the problem, Raya et al. [19] proposed three certificate revocation pro-
tocols for VANETs, namely Revocation using Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists
(RC2RL), Revocation of the Tamper-Proof Device (RTPD), and Distributed Revocation
Protocol (DRP). RC2RL uses a compression technique to reduce the overhead of the
distribution of the CRL. Instead of checking the status of a certificate, RTPD removes
revoked certificates from their corresponding vehicles’ certificate stores by introducing
a tamper-proof device as a vehicle key and certificate management tool. In this case,
the vehicle possessing the revoked certificates is informed of the certification revoca-
tion incident, by which the tamper-proof device automatically removes those revoked
certificates. Different from RC2RL and RTPD, a distributed certificate revocation
mechanism is implemented in DRP to determine the status of a certificate. In DRP,
each vehicle is equipped with an attacker detection system, which enables a vehicle to
identify any compromised peer. When a compromised or malicious vehicle is detected
and located, its neighbors can work together to temporally revoke the compromised
one. However, the aforementioned methods are still far from efficient and practical. we
plan to design a suitable and efficient certificate revocation scheme for VANETs.
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7.2.2 VANET-based Intelligent Traffic Flow Control
In the modern transportation systems, traffic lights take an important role in auto-
matically performing traffic control and management in urban areas, which not only
enhance the driver safety but also facilitate smooth multiplexing at the intersections,
instead of purely relying on human manipulation and policeman on-line monitoring. In
reality, traffic in a city is very much affected by the controller installed in each traffic
light. Much attention has been put to make traffic light controllers more intelligent, by
which an adaptive and context-aware traffic light control system can be achieved even
if with the growing number of road drivers and the limited transportation resources.
The intelligent control on the traffic lights will make the travelling time of the drivers
in a metropolitan area reduced, which could save billions of dollars for our society.
Obviously, collecting traffic information plays an important role in traffic flow control.
Currently, this has been done by equipping the traffic lights with sensing devices such
as pressure sensors for measuring inductance of inductive loops buried in the pavement.
However, deploying sensors in the pavement at an intersection could be very expensive
and difficult to maintain. In addition, the sensors can become inaccurate and fail to
function regularly as time goes by. It is highly desired to have a reliable and cost
effective approach to collect traffic information in an intelligent traffic light control-
ling system. Motivated by the observation, it is planned as a future research effort to
design a VANET-based traffic flow information collection system for intelligent traffic
flow control.
In the long term, we will continue studying cryptography and privacy enhancing
technologies, which serve as basis for various privacy-preserving security systems in my
current research. In addition, we are interested in studying security and privacy issues
with healthcare information technology. Recently, more healthcare providers are tied
to information highway to allow patient data more easily shared. However, with more
strict regulations, such as HIPAA, ensuring personal privacy with respect to medical
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records and healthcare-related information has become an urgent need. In our future
work, we plan to develop novel protocols, algorithms, and techniques to meet security
objectives, such as confidentiality, integrity and privacy, of key identified problems while
allowing patient information to be easily shared in the healthcare system.
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